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The use of whole-genome sequencing in biomedical research is expected to
produce dramatic advances in human health. The increasing use of this power-
ful, data-rich new technology in research, however, will inevitably give rise to
incidental findings (IFs)—findings with individual health or reproductive signifi-
cance that are beyond the aims of the particular research—and the related
questions of whether and to what extent researchers have an ethical obligation
to return IFs. Many have concluded that researchers have an ethical obligation
to return some findings in some circumstances but have provided vague or
context-dependent approaches to determining which IFs must be returned and
when. As a result, researchers have started returning IFs inconsistently, giving
rise to concerns about legal liability in circumstances in which notification
could have potentially prevented injury. Although it is clear that ethical guid-
ance should not be automatically codified as law and that crafting ethical
obligations around legal duties can be inappropriate, the ethical debate should
not proceed unaware of the potential legal ramifications of advancing and
implementing an ethical obligation to return IFs.
This Article assesses the legal claims that could be brought for a researcher’s
failure to return IFs. The potential for researchers to be held liable in tort is still
uncertain and turns largely on a number of factors—including customary
practice and guidance documents—that are still in flux. Unlike medical care,
which has a well-defined duty into which evolving scientific knowledge about
genetics and genomics can readily be incorporated, a researcher’s duty to
return IFs is less well defined, making it difficult to determine at the outset
whether and when legal liability will attach.
This Article advocates for a clearer, ethically sound standard of requiring
that researchers disclose in the informed consent document which approach to
* Senior Policy and Research Analyst, Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues.
At the time of this work, Elizabeth Pike was a post-doctoral fellow in the Department of Bioethics at
the National Institutes of Health. This Article was written by Elizabeth Pike in her private capacity. No
official support or endorsement by the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues or
the Department of Health and Human Services is intended, nor should it be inferred.
** Marjorie Cook Professor of Law, founding Director of the Law & Health Care Program, former
Dean of the University of Maryland School of Law, and Visiting Professor, Berman Institute of
Bioethics, Johns Hopkins University. Professor Rothenberg currently serves as Senior Advisor on
Genomics & Society to the Director of the National Human Genome Research Institute and Visiting
Scholar in the Department of Bioethics at the National Institutes of Health.
*** Deputy Director of the Bioethics Core at the National Human Genome Research Institute, and
faculty member, Department of Bioethics at the National Institutes of Health. © 2014, Elizabeth R.
Pike, Karen H. Rothenberg & Benjamin E. Berkman. With special thanks to Ellen Wright Clayton,
Bryan Dayton, the Honorable Stephen H. Glickman, Dianne Hoffmann, and Amy McGuire for their
insightful comments.
795
offering IFs will be taken. This approach enables participants to know at the
outset which findings, if any, will be returned, allows researchers to ascertain
when their failure to appropriately return incidental findings will give rise to
liability, and enables courts to make determinations that will produce more
consistent legal guidance.
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INTRODUCTION
A little over a decade ago, researchers first sequenced a rough draft of the
human genome, the complete set of human genetic information.1 Sequencing
the human genome took over a decade and cost approximately $2.5 billion.2
The hope and expectation was that delving further into the human genome
would advance scientific knowledge and human health through genomic re-
search. Few could have imagined the progress that would be made in the decade
that followed.
Ten short years later, the estimated cost of sequencing an entire genome has
dropped below $10,000, and the $1,000 genome is within sight.3 Whole-
genome sequencing has quickly been incorporated into research, with research-
ers in a wide variety of disciplines—from mental health to cancer research—
incorporating whole-genome sequencing into their research in hopes of
uncovering a genetic component to the diseases they study.4
With the incorporation of whole-genome sequencing into research comes
concerns about incidental findings5 (IFs)—genetic or genomic discoveries about
individual research participants that are otherwise beyond the scope of re-
search6—and the extent to which researchers have an ethical obligation to offer
to return these results.7 For example, does a researcher looking for the underly-
ing genetic cause of heart disease, who discovers that a research participant’s
1. See, e.g., Francis S. Collins, Michael Morgan & Aristides Patrinos, The Human Genome Project:
Lessons from Large-Scale Biology, 300 SCI. 286, 287 (2003).
2. See International Consortium Completes Human Genome Project, NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RES.
INST. (Apr. 14, 2003), http://www.genome.gov/11006929.
3. See, e.g., Greer Donley, Sara Chandros Hull & Benjamin E. Berkman, Prenatal Whole Genome
Sequencing: Just Because We Can, Should We?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July–Aug. 2012, at 28, 28, 31.
4. See, e.g., Francis S. Collins, Eric D. Green, Alan E. Guttmacher & Mark S. Guyer, A Vision
for the Future of Genomics Research, 422 NATURE 835, 836 (2003); Olena Morozova & Marco A.
Marra, Applications of Next-Generation Sequencing Technologies in Functional Genomics, 92 GENOM-
ICS 255, 257–58 (2008); Ben Tran et al., Cancer Genomics: Technology, Discovery, and Translation,
30 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 647, 647 (2012).
5. “Incidental findings” can also be called “secondary findings” or “incidentalomes.”
6. See Susan M. Wolf et al., The Law of Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research:
Establishing Researchers’ Duties, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 361, 363 (2008) (defining IFs as “a finding
concerning an individual research participant that has potential health or reproductive importance and is
discovered in the course of conducting research but is beyond the aims of the study”).
7. See infra section I.B.
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genetic sequence indicates a predisposition to an untreated condition, such as
breast cancer, have an obligation to disclose that information? The references in
this Article to the return of IFs are, in most cases, shorthand for an offer to
return IFs which a participant can autonomously reject.
Those who have considered whether and to what extent researchers have an
ethical obligation to offer to return IFs arising from genomic research have
generally found there to be an ethical obligation to return some IFs in some
contexts, but they have offered varying or context-specific standards or frame-
works that are not sufficient to solve this difficult and controversial problem.8
Perhaps because of this lack of unanimity, and in the absence of clear guidance,
researchers have taken a variety of approaches to returning IFs in practice, and
some researchers have chosen not to return IFs altogether.9 This gap between
the view that researchers have an ethical obligation to return at least some IFs,
and the reality that some, but not all, researchers choose to return IFs has led
many to worry about the potential for legal liability arising from inconsistent
approaches to returning IFs.10 Given that tort law duties are determined by the
prevailing standard of care, recognition by scholars and the research community
of an ethical obligation to return IFs could ultimately lead to a legal obligation.11
We examine whether, and under what circumstances, there may be a legal
obligation to offer to return IFs—an analysis that is currently lacking.12 Al-
though there is no law or case law directly on point,13 this Article concludes that
there is a small possibility that a failure to appropriately return IFs could result
in legal liability under law as it stands today. Furthermore, there is a greater
likelihood of legal liability as scholars and researchers continue to advocate for
an ethical obligation, particularly if returning IFs becomes widespread prac-
8. See infra section I.C.
9. See, e.g., Mildred K. Cho, Understanding Incidental Findings in the Context of Genetics and
Genomics, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 280, 280 (2008) (noting the “common practice among researchers to
notify participants during the informed consent process that no individual results will be disclosed,
‘incidental’ or otherwise”); Wolf et al., supra note 6, at 362 (“Despite the potential to generate IFs
during the course of research, researchers, Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), and universities have
been conducting research with no agreement that they have any responsibility to address and report
IFs.”).
10. See infra section I.D.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See, e.g., Susan M. Wolf, The Role of Law in the Debate over Return of Research Results and
Incidental Findings: The Challenge of Developing Law for Translational Science, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 435, 439 (2012) (calling work on the legal implications of IFs “surely needed”); Ellen Wright
Clayton & Amy L. McGuire, The Legal Risks of Returning Results of Genomics Research, 14 GENETICS
MED. 473, 475 (2012) (noting that “the possibility of exposing researchers to legal liability for neg-
ligence if results are not offered and returned deserves careful analysis”).
13. See, e.g., Richard L. Furman, Jr., Genetic Test Results and the Duty to Disclose: Can Medical
Researchers Control Liability?, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 391, 404 (1999) (“No court has yet been faced
with deciding whether a nonphysician medical researcher has an affirmative duty to disclose genetic
test results to a research subject or other third party.”); Wolf, supra note 12, at 436 (“There is no law
directly on point. . . . To date, no reported legal case has been discovered that addresses return of results
or incidental findings in the domain of research.”).
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tice.14 We also recognize that fragmented and varying ethical guidance could
give rise to uncertain and inconsistent legal duties—a result that would make it
difficult for researchers, participants, and courts and that could cause gridlock in
this emerging scientific arena.
For this reason, this Article argues that the research community should
consider prospectively adopting a clearer approach to returning IFs that could
give rise to a more definitive legal standard delineating when IFs should be
returned. A clearer legal standard would tell researchers when they are expected
to offer to return IFs, and when they will face liability for falling short of this
standard; a clearer approach would also let participants know which IFs they
can reasonably expect to have returned.15
Part I provides an overview of the issue of IFs in the context of whole
genome sequencing research, including a discussion of the IFs that might arise
in genomics research; the ethical principles that potentially underlie a research-
er’s ethical obligation to return IFs; and the different approaches setting forth
whether, when, and which IFs ought to be returned. Part II reviews the possible
tort law claims that could be brought alleging a failure to adequately return IFs
and recognizes that there may only be a narrow set of circumstances in which
researchers could be held liable today. As the research community increasingly
recognizes an ethical obligation to return IFs, as guidance documents set forth
which IFs should be returned and when, and as research custom moves toward
routine return of IFs, researchers will be increasingly likely to face legal
liability. Part III recommends that researchers develop clearer policies for when
IFs will be returned and communicate to research participants whether, when,
and which IFs will be returned. Research participants can thereby develop
reasonable expectations about the IFs they can expect to receive. This Part sets
forth and analyzes several approaches that would provide clear and consistent
guidance and selects the approach that best allows researchers to make informed
decisions about appropriate policies for returning IFs. This approach also makes
clearest to research participants which IFs they can reasonably expect to have
returned. Part IV suggests that courts that are faced with lawsuits alleging a
researcher’s failure to adequately return IFs adopt the proposed standard, bring-
ing clarity to this uncertain terrain.
I. AN ETHICAL OBLIGATION TO RETURN INCIDENTAL FINDINGS FROM
GENOMIC RESEARCH?
The high likelihood—or virtual certainty—that IFs will arise in genomic
research has given rise to questions about a researcher’s ethical obligation to
return IFs. This Part notes that certain ethical principles—beneficence, respect
for persons, a duty to rescue, reciprocity, and partial entrustment—could give
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
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rise to an obligation to return IFs; other notions, however, including non-
maleficence, concerns about the therapeutic misconception, and worries about
burdening the research enterprise—caution against finding such an ethical
obligation. This Part examines the guidance documents—documents that seek
to establish best practices and that are often relied upon by practitioners—and
frameworks that assess whether and when IFs should be returned.
A. INCIDENTAL FINDINGS IN GENOMIC RESEARCH
Over the past decade, biomedical research has increasingly incorporated
whole-genome sequencing, whole-exome sequencing (a process of selectively
sequencing the small portion of the genome that codes for proteins, which is
believed to cover approximately eighty-five percent of the disease-causing
regions in the genome), and other large-scale genomic methodologies into
research in hopes of better understanding the genetic causes of disease.16 With
these new technologies, researchers are no longer limited to interrogating
certain targeted portions of the genome; instead they can conduct genome-wide
analyses, casting a wider net in the hopes of finding answers to their research
questions.17 Although a powerful research tool, this broader sequencing gives
rise to a greater likelihood of finding IFs. Furthermore, as the cost of whole-
genome sequencing falls, researchers who had heretofore used targeting sequenc-
ing (or who had not used genetic methodologies at all) will increasingly
incorporate whole-genome sequencing into their research, increasing the num-
ber of studies in which IFs are likely to become a relevant issue.
The issue of IFs is not unique to genomic research; IFs can arise from a
number of different types of tests.18 What distinguishes the issue of IFs in
genetic research from IFs in imaging and other research procedures is the
likelihood and scope of potential IFs. In imaging research—research conducted
using imaging techniques that include MRI, CT scans, and PET scans to
examine particular parts of the body—the question is whether one of a limited
handful of types of IFs will occur.19 In the context of genetic research, the
question is how to deal with the dozens or hundreds of disparate IFs that can
potentially be uncovered in any individual research participant’s genetic
material.20
16. See, e.g., PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, PRIVACY AND PROGRESS IN
WHOLE GENOME SEQUENCING 17, 106, 116–17 (2012) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N]; Collins et al.,
supra note 4, at 836; Morozova & Marra, supra note 4, at 840.
17. See PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N, supra note 16, at 9.
18. See, e.g., Wolf et al., supra note 6, at 361 (noting that the “technologies used in research to
generate images, scans, and data can now produce so much information that there is significant
potential for incidental findings”).
19. See, e.g., Nicholas M. Orme et al., Incidental Findings in Imaging Research: Evaluating
Incidence, Benefit, and Burden, 170 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1525, 1528 (2010) (finding that approxi-
mately forty percent of imaging examinations had at least one IF).
20. Some have even argued that IFs could be in the thousands. For example, applying a set of
criteria developed in 2010 by the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI), researchers
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IFs can exhibit a wide range of usefulness.21 For example, an IF can indicate
an urgent, clinically actionable condition such as a predisposition to non-polyp-
forming colon cancer—a cancer that is fatal and otherwise undetectable through
standard screening.22 An IF could predict a propensity to develop disease in the
future, such as the possibility of developing breast cancer or Alzheimer’s.23
Even when the variant’s meaning is known, “the probabilistic character of
genetic information and the pleiotropic nature of genes make accurate interpreta-
tion . . . particularly challenging.”24 Some IFs will reveal information that is not
clinically significant, such as information about ethnic or geographic heritage.25
Yet other variants, perhaps even most variants, may instead be something the
meaning and import of which is unknown.26
When the consequence of the variant is known and the finding has clinical
significance, research participants may benefit from learning about IFs discov-
ered during the course of research. A research participant who learns that she
has a BRCA mutation, an indication of a predisposition to developing breast
cancer, could take measures aimed at preventing undesirable future medical
outcomes, including participation in regular mammogram screening.27 Even
research participants who learn that they are predisposed to Alzheimer’s dis-
ease—a disease that is currently unpreventable and untreatable—may decide to
monitor more vigilantly scientific advances to obtain the benefit of any potential
analyzed whole-genome-sequence data from asymptomatic individuals and concluded that each had
approximately 2,000 of the most serious category of variants; any or all of these variants could show up
as IFs in research. See Christopher A. Cassa et al., Disclosing Pathogenic Genetic Variants to Research
Participants: Quantifying an Emerging Ethical Responsibility, 22 GENOME RES. 421, 423 (2012); see
also Catherine Gliwa & Benjamin E. Berkman, Do Researchers Have an Obligation to Actively Look
for Genetic Incidental Findings?, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Feb. 2013, at 32, 37 (“Before any filtering, each
exome typically has around 80,000 variants; each genome, 3 to 4 million . . . . Thus, the first step in
identifying significant mutations is filtering the results to leave only those variants most likely to cause
disease . . . This reduces the number of relevant exome variants to around 10,000–15,000.”) (internal
citations omitted).
21. See, e.g., Matthew P. Gordon, A Legal Duty to Disclose Individual Research Findings to
Research Subjects?, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 225, 228 (2009) (noting that “data will vary regarding
predictive value, with a range from highly predictive of health outcomes to negligibly so”); Wolf et al.,
supra note 6, at 363 (noting that IFs range from “those that have clear clinical significance and reveal
conditions that can be treated . . . to those whose clinical meaning is unknown”).
22. See, e.g., Brodersen N. Henning et al., Anticipated Reactions to Genetic Testing for Hereditary
Non-Polyposis Colorectal Cancer Susceptibility, 66 CLINICAL GENETICS 437, 437–38 (2004).
23. See, e.g., NAT’L INST. ON AGING, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE
GENETICS FACT SHEET 4 (2011), available at http://www.nia.nih.gov/alzheimers/publication/alzheimers-
disease-genetics-fact-sheet.
24. Vardit Ravitsky & Benjamin S. Wilfond, Disclosing Individual Genetic Results to Research
Participants, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Nov./Dec. 2006, at 8, 8.
25. See, e.g., Wolf et al., supra note 6, at 362 (“Genetic family studies are estimated to reveal
misattributed paternity in about 10 percent of research participants in the general population . . . .”).
26. See, e.g., Gliwa & Berkman, supra note 20, at 36 (“Genomic science is still in its infancy, and
the amount we know about the relationship between genomic data and human disease is dwarfed by the
amount we do not yet know.”).
27. See, e.g., NAT’L INST. ON AGING, supra note 23, at 4.
2014] 801FINDING FAULT
future treatments.28
Despite the potential benefits of learning about genetic predispositions, disclos-
ing IFs—even IFs of known clinical significance—may nevertheless pose risks
for individual research participants. Disclosing IFs that suggest genetic predispo-
sition for disease can cause psychosocial harms and may raise concerns about
loss of privacy or confidentiality.29 Given the possibility that any IF could be a
false positive, a research participant’s decision to undergo medical treatment in
response to an IF “could lead research participants down inappropriate or
dangerous clinical pathways.”30 As noted in the article, The Future of Incidental
Findings: Should They Be Viewed as Benefits?:
The positive or negative outcome depends partly on one’s circumstances (e.g.,
whether one has insurance to cover follow-up evaluation or must shoulder
crippling costs and even job loss, whether discovery of the IF saves one’s life
or leads only to expensive and burdensome tests yielding no useful medical
information) and one’s values (e.g., whether a diagnosis of untreatable cancer
prompts a clarification of one’s priorities, provides the opportunity for salvific
suffering, or lowers a black cloud of depression over one’s final months).31
Disclosing IFs also has costs for the research enterprise. Before returning an
IF, researchers must determine that an IF is analytically valid—that the IF was
correctly identified by the sequencing process as a variant.32 Determining
analytic validity may require confirmation from a laboratory approved under the
28. See, e.g., Lisa S. Parker, The Future of Incidental Findings: Should They be Viewed as Benefits?,
36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 341, 344 (2008) (“Nevertheless, one must guard against assessing benefit solely
in medical terms. Health risk information has enabled people to engage in reproductive and other life
planning and has afforded many individuals psychological benefit, even when nothing could be done
medically.”).
29. See, e.g., Laura M. Beskow & Wylie Burke, Offering Individual Genetic Research Results:
Context Matters, SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED., June 30, 2010, at 1, 1 (“Genetic research typically involves
informational risk, including the potential for psychosocial harm and for the loss of privacy or
confidentiality.”); Annelien L. Bredenoord et al., Disclosure of Individual Genetic Data to Research
Participants: The Debate Reconsidered, 27 TRENDS IN GENETICS 41, 43–44 (2011) (noting that “[t]he
information disclosed to research participants could be harmful in several ways,” including “adverse
social and financial consequences, such as affecting someone’s opportunity to obtain or maintain health
insurance[,] and could potentially be stigmatizing”); Franklin G. Miller, Michelle M. Mello & Steven
Joffe, Incidental Findings In Human Subjects Research: What Do Investigators Owe Research Partici-
pants?, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 271, 277 (2008) (“Disclosing incidental findings carries the risk of
distress in the subject, the risk of a false-positive finding, and the risk of physical harm from procedures
to diagnose and (in some cases) treat the putative problem.”).
30. David Kaufman et al., Subjects Matter: A Survey of Public Opinions About a Large Genetic
Cohort Study, 10 GENETICS MED. 831, 837 (2008).
31. See Parker, supra note 28, at 343.
32. See, e.g., Susan M. Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research:
Analysis and Recommendations, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 219, 222 (2008); Wolf et al., supra note 6, at
376 (“Before researchers offer to disclose certain IFs to their research participants, they have a duty to
verify and evaluate those IFs.”).
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Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA).33 Researchers must
also ensure that results are clinically valid—that the genetic variant identified is
predictive of a propensity towards developing a specific disease,34 which may
require a time-consuming analysis of the current state of scientific knowledge.35
Some guidelines also require that IFs be clinically actionable before they can be
returned—a requirement that research participants be able to act upon the
finding to avoid unwanted medical outcomes.36 A requirement of actionability
means that researchers must go through an additional analytic process to assess
whether a particular variant should be returned, a process that could require
additional time and expense. The process of validating IFs imposes additional
burdens on the research enterprise, both in time and money.37
IFs in genomic research are therefore extremely common and likely to occur,
with frequency increasing as one broadens the definition of what counts as an
IF. IFs may indicate important, clinically actionable results or may instead be
findings the meaning and importance of which are unknown. Returning IFs may
benefit individual research participants, but it also risks harming individuals and
burdening the research enterprise.
B. PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING AN ETHICAL OBLIGATION TO RETURN INCIDENTAL FINDINGS
Given the vast array of IFs that could be discovered in genomic research, the
question arises as to whether and when researchers have an ethical obligation to
return IFs to individual research participants. A number of principles support an
33. See, e.g., Bredenoord et al., supra note 29, at 43 (“[I]f results are obtained in a research
laboratory, feedback could also imply re-testing of the genetic data in an accredited clinical labora-
tory . . . .”); Clayton & McGuire, supra note 12, at 474 (“Research testing typically does not meet the
laboratory requirements of the clinic. There are reasons why tests whose results may be used to alter
clinical care must be obtained in clinically approved laboratories . . . and interpreted by appropriately
qualified clinicians.”). There is some disagreement about whether this confirmation is, in fact, neces-
sary. See, e.g., Richard R. Fabsitz et al., Ethical and Practical Guidelines for Reporting Genetic
Research Results to Study Participants: Updated Guidelines from a National Heart, Lung, and Blood
Institute Working Group, 10 CIRCULATION: CARDIOVASCULAR GENETICS 574, 576 (2010) (“Working Group
members disagreed on the interpretation of what constitutes compliance with the CLIA regulations for
the return of research results in genetics studies.”).
34. See, e.g., Wolf et al., supra note 6, at 376 (“The researcher must confirm the existence of an IF,
determine whether the IF has likely clinical or reproductive significance and whether the level of
significance warrants offering the IF to the research participant, and consult a clinical expert, if
necessary, to make these determinations.”).
35. Although databases are beginning to emerge that specify the IFs that ought to be returned, these
databases are still somewhat flawed. See, e.g., Gliwa & Berkman, supra note 20, at 37 (“Although the
curators of some databases may make a recommendation as to whether there is sufficient published
evidence to suggest that the variant has been proven pathogenic or not, the irregular quality of these
data means that currently, for every variant examined, a researcher still has to read all of the primary
literature and assess for her- or himself the chances that the variant has a significant chance of causing
disease in that individual.”).
36. See, e.g., Wolf et al., supra note 6, at 378.
37. See, e.g., Wolf et al., supra note 6, at 364 (noting that “an IF discovered during the course of
research can increase the cost and burden to the research enterprise and institutions supporting medical
research”).
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ethical obligation to return IFs.38 Beneficence, for example, requires that research-
ers take efforts to “maximize possible benefits and minimize possible harms.”39
With regard to IFs, returning IFs could benefit participants if the information
enabled participants to take additional precautions to prevent or minimize future
medical harm.40 To the extent particular IFs are likely to be valuable to research
participants, beneficence suggests that the IF should be returned.41
Respect for persons—a recognition that individuals should be treated as
autonomous agents, capable of making decisions and acting in accordance with
their unique value systems—might also support an ethical obligation to return
IFs.42 Respect for persons suggests that when researchers have information
that participants would find useful in making their own medical decisions, such
information should be disclosed.43 Respect for persons may even support
returning IFs for which disclosure may be harmful, recognizing that individuals
should be free to make autonomous decisions based upon this information.44
A third principle, and possible source of an ethical obligation to return IFs,
is the duty to rescue, which obligates an individual to act when presented with
an opportunity to alleviate the serious plight of another with minimal burden
to oneself.45 The extent of any duty to rescue turns on “the urgency of the
38. See, e.g., Ravitsky & Wilfond, supra note 24, at 8 (noting that “ethical principles of beneficence,
respect, reciprocity, and justice provide justification for routinely offering certain results to research
participants”).
39. Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Research, Report of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192, 23,194 (Apr. 18, 1979) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (2010))
[hereinafter Belmont Report].
40. See, e.g., Miller, Mello & Joffe, supra note 29, at 277 (“[D]isclosing incidental findings also
carries the potential benefit of obtaining medical intervention to correct a health problem that may be
dangerous or adjusting life plans in light of an untreatable condition.”).
41. See, e.g., Bredenoord et al., supra note 29, at 44; Robert C. Green et al., ACMG Recommenda-
tions for Reporting of Incidental Findings in Clinical Exome and Genome Sequencing, 15 GENETICS
MED. 565, 571 (2013) (selecting variants to return that maximize benefits and minimize harms);
Ravitsky & Wilfond, supra note 24, at 9 (“Beneficence requires that investigators offer results that are
clinically useful, which means results are expected to be valuable to participants’ physical or psychologi-
cal well being, to their reproductive decision making or to their life planning.”).
42. See, e.g., Belmont Report, supra note 39, at 23,193 (“To respect autonomy is to give weight to
autonomous persons’ considered opinions and choices while refraining from obstructing their actions
unless they are clearly detrimental to others.”).
43. See, e.g., Bredenoord et al., supra note 29, at 44 (“[I]f participants assign personal value to
results they should, out of respect for the participant’s autonomy, be disclosed.”); Ravitsky & Wilfond,
supra note 24, at 9 (“Respect for participants requires that investigators provide results that may be of
interest to participants and that have been acquired based on their participation.”).
44. See, e.g., Bredenoord et al., supra note 29, at 44 (“Even if there are risks or potential harmful
consequences, participants should decide themselves if they want to run those risks by requesting
results.”). Nevertheless, respect for persons may also encompass an individual’s right not to know. See
Ravitsky & Wilfond, supra note 24, at 9 (“Respect also requires that investigators respond to
participants’ preferences to receive, or not receive, a certain result.”).
45. See, e.g., Leah Belsky & Henry S. Richardson, Medical Researchers’ Ancillary Clinical Care
Responsibilities, 328 BRITISH MED. J. 1494, 1494 (2004) (arguing that “everyone arguably has a duty to
rescue those in need, at least when they can do so at minimal cost to themselves”); Beskow & Burke,
supra note 29, at 1 (“A duty to rescue is based on the premise that, when confronted with a clear and
804 [Vol. 102:795THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
situation, the severity of the outcome if nothing is done, the ability of the
potential rescuer to prevent that outcome, and the fact that only modest effort or
sacrifice on the rescuer’s part is required.”46 The quintessential example of a
general duty to rescue involves a passerby seeing a young child drowning in a
shallow pool of water; with minimal inconvenience—perhaps a few minutes of
time spent, or clothes that become wet—the passerby can save the life of a
drowning child. The passerby is generally thought to have a moral obligation,
even though not a legal duty, to rescue the drowning child.47
Under a duty-to-rescue-based argument, researchers would have an ethical
obligation to return certain IFs to research participants if the level of effort
required to return them is minimal and the possible benefit to participants is
great.48 Arguably, the current process for returning IFs is burdensome,49 and
few known findings rise to the level of alleviating a serious plight of another.50
A duty to rescue would therefore be unlikely to attach under these circum-
stances.
A fourth principle, reciprocity, suggests that those who contribute to the
research enterprise—either with time or by providing biological material—are
owed something in return for their participation.51 Though the exact contours of
what the principle of reciprocity requires are subject to debate, a reasonable
immediate need, an individual who is in a position to help must take action to try to prevent serious
harm when the cost or risk to self is minimal.”); Miller, Mello & Joffe, supra note 29, at 273 (noting
that “presented with a situation in which you can prevent something very bad from happening, or
alleviate someone’s dire plight, by making only a slight (or even moderate) sacrifice, then it would be
wrong not to do so”).
46. Miller, Mello & Joffe, supra note 29, at 273.
47. See, e.g., Peter Singer, The Drowning Child and the Expanding Circle, NEW INTERNATIONALIST
MAG. (Apr. 5, 1997), www.newint.org/features/1997/04/05/drowning/.
48. See, e.g., Beskow & Burke, supra note 29, at 1–2 (noting that the duty to rescue “is met when,
in the course of research, an investigator discovers genetic information that clearly indicates a high
probability of a serious condition for which an effective intervention is readily available”).
49. Although certain whole-genome-sequencing techniques and an understanding of the significance
of newly identified IFs currently remain within the exclusive province of research, see, e.g., Gliwa &
Berkman, supra note 20, at 33 (“At least at present and likely in the near future, WGS and genomic
analysis will be primarily available through research, giving researchers unique access to benefits that
only they can provide to their participants.”); Gordon, supra note 21, at 247 (“For example, when
genetic researchers make an initial discovery that a particular gene is linked with a higher incidence of
a disease, they alone possess that knowledge, at least prior to sharing or publication. In such a
circumstance, a subject with the relevant genotype could not possibly learn the salient information from
any source other than the researcher.”), the current process of identifying which IFs should be returned
is too burdensome for it to rise to the level of an ethical obligation, see, e.g., Gliwa & Berkman, supra
note 20, at 37 (“[D]etermining precisely whether a specific variant is likely to cause disease (pathogenic-
ity), however, must be done manually, and requires considerable time and diligence.”).
50. See, e.g., Gliwa & Berkman, supra note 20, at 36. Recent recommendations promulgated by the
American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics set forth twenty-four phenotypic outcomes that a
working group considered to be sufficiently serious that it recommended that return of those findings be
mandatory in the clinic. See Green, supra note 41, at 569–71.
51. See, e.g., Bredenoord et al., supra note 29, at 44 (noting that “some argue that people tend to
expect an element of reciprocity when contributing to research, particularly in the context of biobank
research”).
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interpretation could include notifying those who contribute biological samples
of relevant IFs.52
Finally, the partial-entrustment model—developed to assess when researchers
are ethically obligated to provide care beyond that which is necessary to protect
participants from the risks of research or for the scientific conduct of the
research, otherwise known as ancillary care—sets forth a framework to assess
whether researchers are ethically obligated to return IFs.53 The partial-
entrustment model recognizes that participants grant researchers access to
otherwise private health information, creating a relationship of limited trust, but
that research participants do not generally rely exclusively on researchers for
their medical needs.54 Under the partial-entrustment/ancillary-care model, once
a condition is determined to be within the scope of entrustment, the strength of
any obligation turns on a variety of factors, including: (1) participants’ vulnerabil-
ity; (2) participants’ uncompensated risks or burdens; (3) the depth, in intensity
and duration, of the researcher–participant relationship; and, (4) participants’
dependence on the researchers.55
Although several of the variables in the partial-entrustment model, including
participant vulnerability and uncompensated risks, cannot be assessed in the
abstract, analysis of the remaining variables suggest that researchers may not
have a universal ethical obligation to return IFs.56 For example, researchers
conducting genomic research may have only a minimal, or nonexistent, relation-
ship with research participants.57 And participants in genomic research entrust
their genetic information to researchers but do not generally entrust researchers
with their medical care.58
52. Reciprocity can also be criticized, however, because the benefits of returning IFs can be
arbitrarily and unevenly distributed to participants, even though all participants arguably have an equal
claim.
53. See, e.g., Henry S. Richardson & Leah Belsky, The Ancillary-Care Responsibilities of Medical
Researchers: An Ethical Framework for Thinking About the Clinical Care That Researchers Owe Their
Subjects, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.–Feb. 2004, at 25, 26 (“Ancillary care is that which goes beyond
the requirements of scientific validity, safety, keeping promises, or rectifying injuries.”).
54. See id. at 30 (“The scope of entrustment is not set by what subjects hope or expect, nor by what
they think they are entrusting to researchers. Rather, the initial scope of entrustment is fixed by the
subset of the permissions obtained during the consent process that are required for the research team to
carry out the study validly and safely.”).
55. Belsky & Richardson, supra note 45, at 1495; see also Richardson & Belsky, supra note 53, at
30–31 (discussing factors).
56. See, e.g., Miller, Mello & Joffe, supra note 29, at 275 (“[T]he professional’s privileged access
to private information in the context of a consensual, professional relationship, together with his or
her competence to identify the potential significance of this information, trigger and give shape to
obligations to respond to incidental findings.”).
57. Beskow & Burke, supra note 29, at 3 (“With the advent of large-scale repositories that facilitate
unprecedented sharing, a rapidly increasing amount of genomic research can occur with no interaction
at all between researchers and the individuals who contributed the specimens and/or data under
study.”).
58. Id. at 2–3 (“[P]articipants in most genomic research entrust their information to researchers—not
aspects of their health care, as may be the case with the clinical research initially contemplated under
ancillary care frameworks.”).
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Several principles caution against finding that researchers have an ethical
obligation to return IFs. The first principle is that of non-maleficence, often
stated as “do no harm.”59 As discussed in section I.A, returning IFs has the
potential to cause harm, either by causing emotional unrest upon learning of
upsetting information or by causing physical harm to the extent false positives
result from unnecessary medical treatment.60 Because IFs can cause harm, the
principle of non-maleficence cautions against returning IFs in the absence of a
plan to minimize the risks of harm.
Concerns about the therapeutic misconception may also counsel against
an ethical obligation to return IFs.61 Many research participants suffer from
what is called the therapeutic misconception—the mistaken conflation of medi-
cal research with clinical care.62 As a result, research participants often believe
that researchers will provide treatment comparable to that provided by physi-
cians and accordingly believe that researchers who come across information
that can prevent future medical harm will disclose this information even absent
a fiduciary relationship. As has been noted, however, though the primary goal
of medicine is to treat individual patients, the primary goal of research is to
produce generalizable knowledge.63 Participants may rely on researchers in
ways that were never intended. Researchers who choose to return IFs may
59. See, e.g., Bredenoord et al., supra note 29, at 43 (“A final argument supporting a restrictive
disclosure policy is based on the principle of nonmaleficence.”).
60. See, e.g., Miller, Mello & Joffe, supra note 29, at 277 (“Disclosing incidental findings carries the
risk of distress in the subject, the risk of a false-positive finding, and the risk of physical harm from
procedures to diagnose and (in some cases) treat the putative problem.”); see also Bredenoord et al.,
supra note 29, at 43 (“The information disclosed to research participants could be harmful in several
ways.”).
61. See, e.g., Bredenoord et al., supra note 29, at 42 (“The most prominent argument supporting a
restrictive disclosure policy contends that blurring the distinction between research and clinical care has
the potential to lead to the therapeutic misconception . . . .”); Gliwa & Berkman, supra note 20, at 32
(noting that “others see an obligation to disclose incidental findings as inappropriately emphasizing
benefit to individual participants over the production of generalizable knowledge, and worry about the
risks associated with conflating research and clinical care”); Kaufman et al., supra note 30, at 837
(“Some critics of returning individual genetic research results to research participants cite a version of
the problem of ‘therapeutic misconception’—that participants will confuse researchers and research
data with clinicians and clinical data—and that individual results generally should not be returned.”);
Wolf et al., supra note 6, at 364 (“[R]esearchers are performing research, not clinical care, and thus are
not obligated to return information of potential clinical importance; indeed, returning such information
may encourage the therapeutic misconception.”).
62. See, e.g., Isaac S. Kohane & Patrick L. Taylor, Multidimensional Results Reporting to Partici-
pants in Genomic Studies: Getting It Right, SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED., June 23, 2010, at 1, 1 (“Partici-
pants believe that researchers are obligated to provide useful personal results.”).
63. See, e.g., Belmont Report, supra note 39, at 23,193 (“‘[R]esearch’ designates an activity
designed to test an hypothesis, permit conclusions to be drawn, and thereby to develop or contribute to
generalizable knowledge.”); see also Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 838
(Md. 2001) (“The experiment is driven by the investigator’s dedication to the advancement of
knowledge . . . ; it is also driven by society’s interest in future benefits that will flow from medical
discoveries.”).
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therefore inappropriately contribute to the therapeutic misconception.64
A final concern counseling against finding an ethical obligation to return IFs
is the burden that this obligation would place on the research enterprise.65
Returning IFs requires outlays of time and money that must be diverted from
other research objectives. Investing this time and money into returning IFs—
information that primarily benefits individual research participants—detracts
from the goal of creating generalizable knowledge in ways that some may argue
is unethical.66
This section is merely intended to lay out the range of principled arguments
that scholars have made for and against the idea that researchers have a duty to
disclose IFs. Although it appears that these ethical principles may support
some (possibly limited) duty to disclose incidental findings, the contours of any
possible duty still remain unsettled. Appeal to ethical principles provides no
clear answer as to whether researchers must, can, should, or should not return
IFs.67 As shown in the next section, this uncertainty carries into research
practice.
C. INCONSISTENCY IN PRACTICE
Given the inconclusive guidance provided by an analysis of the relevant
ethical principles, scholars and practitioners have sought to resolve the issues of
when, whether, and which IFs ought to be returned through practical guidance.
Researchers can choose to take a range of actions with regard to returning IFs,
from returning nothing to returning everything (such as a comprehensively
annotated analysis of the subject’s entire genome). Most of those who have
studied this issue conclude that neither of these extremes is practicable or
64. In response to concerns about the therapeutic misconception, one could argue that the solution is
simply to ensure that the informed consent process more clearly and explicitly details what participants
can (and cannot) expect from the research team. Although this critique has some merit, it ignores that
general understanding of even the best informed consent documents is dismal and that clinical-type
relationships can induce therapeutic misconception, independent of the text in the informed consent
document. Furthermore, the practical reality is that informed consent documents will often be far from
ideal, as we discuss in detail in Parts III and IV.
65. See, e.g., Belsky & Richardson, supra note 45, at 1494 (noting that “offering ancillary care this
broadly may drain limited human and financial resources”); Pilar N. Ossorio, Letting the Gene Out of
the Bottle: A Comment on Returning Individual Research Results to Participants, AM. J. BIOETHICS,
Nov./Dec. 2006, at 24, 25 (“[T]he practicalities of returning results may impose untenable burdens on
the existing research infrastructure.”).
66. See, e.g., Bredenoord et al., supra note 29, at 43 (“Disclosure can be resource intensive, and
some argue that it would be unethical to use those resources for feedback when they could have been
used for research.”).
67. See, e.g., Ossorio, supra note 65, at 24 (“The authors note that returning certain types of
individual results is consistent with principles of beneficence, respect for persons, reciprocity, and
justice, but they never state why returning results rises to the level of an obligation for researchers. An
act may be consistent with many principles and still be superogatory or even wrong, all things
considered.”).
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appropriate.68 Rather, they generally conclude that there is an ethical obligation
to return at least some IFs in some circumstances69 but offer a variety of
sometimes inconsistent approaches about which IFs must be returned and
when.70
A majority view is beginning to emerge that IFs should be returned only
when they are analytically valid,71 have significant health implications, and are
clinically actionable.72 A number of institutional efforts to promulgate guidance
on this issue, and on the related issue of when individual research results should
be returned, have reiterated these factors.73 The consistency of these criteria
68. See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 12, at 444–45 (“[I]t has become hard to find participants in the return
of results debate who maintain that no individual results or findings should ever be returned, no matter
how clinically urgent the information. . . . [I]t is also increasingly difficult to find commentators who
argue for conveying all information derived in the research sphere, at least at this juncture. Too much of
that information still remains uncertain and even mistaken, to dump it all on research participants.”);
see also Bredenoord et al., supra note 29, at 42 (“At one end of the spectrum it is argued that no
individual genetic research results should be disclosed whatsoever. This, however, is an exceptional
position, because only one publication adhered strictly to a ‘no disclosure at all’ policy, even of
life-saving information—and this article was restricted to biobank research.”).
69. See, e.g., Clayton & McGuire, supra note 12, at 473 (“There is substantial consensus that people
should be offered results that could trigger interventions that are lifesaving or that could avert serious
adverse health outcomes; there is somewhat less consensus about whether people should be offered
results that may have reproductive implications or that could be personally meaningful.”); Gliwa &
Berkman, supra note 20, at 33 (“[O]pinion seems to be moving toward the idea that there is some
obligation to offer to disclose a limited set of findings . . . .”); Gordon, supra note 21, at 235
(“Commentators generally support the notion that there is a moral duty to disclose medically important
information.”).
70. See, e.g., Clayton & McGuire, supra note 12, at 473 (“[T]he debate quickly turns to issues
of mechanics (e.g., which results? who discloses? for how long does the obligation exist?).”); Fabsitz
et al., supra note 33, at 575 (concluding that “debate continues over when, how, and who should return
individual results to participants”); Ossorio, supra note 65, at 25 (“I believe that we will identify a
miniscule number of cases in which researchers have obligations to offer individual genetic research
results and a very large number of cases in which it may be ethically permissible to do so. There will
also be a few cases in which it will be impermissible to return results.”).
71. A commonly accepted definition of “analytic validity” is how accurately and reliably the test
measures the genetic variant of interest. See, e.g., Genomic Testing: ACCE Model Process for
Evaluating Genetic Tests, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/genomics/
gtesting/ACCE/ (last updated Jan. 3, 2010).
72. See, e.g., Gliwa & Berkman, supra note 20, at 33 (noting that the consensus is moving toward
disclosure when findings “meet an exacting standard of validity, severity, and actionability”); Wolf
et al., supra note 6, at 373 (“[P]articipants are entitled to information regarding IFs of likely clinical or
reproductive significance . . . .”).
Other scholars have set forth other factors, including communicability, the closeness of the researcher–
participant relationship, the subjective interests of the participants, and the type of study. These
positions have not reached a comparable level of consensus. See, e.g., Kohane & Taylor, supra note 62,
at 3 (focusing on communicability); Amy L. McGuire, Timothy Caulfield & Mildred K. Cho, Research
Ethics and the Challenge of Whole-Genome Sequencing, 9 NATURE REV. GENETICS 152, 153 (2008)
(focusing on “the type of study, the clinical significance and reliability of the information, and whether
the study involves patients . . . or healthy volunteers”); Ravitsky & Wilfond, supra note 24, at 14–15
(focusing on the researcher–participant relationship); Mark A. Rothstein, Tiered Disclosure Options
Promote the Autonomy and Well-Being of Research Subjects, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Nov./Dec. 2006, at 20,
20 (focusing on the subjective interests of research participants).
73. See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 12, at 440–41 (summarizing the positions of the institutions that have
considered the issue); see also NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN BIOLOGI-
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belies the vagueness in how these terms are defined.74 For example, what
constitutes a “significant” health implication? Must the consequences be life or
death? Or is an IF that, once revealed, leads to actions that can lower one’s
chance of contracting an unpleasant disease sufficiently significant? Must the IF
have individual significance, or is reproductive significance—significance to
offspring—sufficient?75
The same definitional uncertainty applies to the requirement that findings be
clinically actionable. One group, the 2010 National Heart, Lung, and Blood
Institute (NHLBI) Working Group, defined “clinically actionable” as follows:
Actionable means that disclosure has the potential to lead to an improved
health outcome; there must be established therapeutic or preventive inter-
ventions available or other available actions that may change the course
of disease. Actionable may include surveillance and interventions to improve
clinical course, such as by delaying onset, leading to earlier diagnosis,
increasing likelihood of less burdensome disease, or expanding treatment
options.76
This definition seems to foreclose returning IFs that are not clinically action-
able now but may become clinically actionable in the future.77 And still other
approaches have been suggested for defining clinical actionability.78
In addition to vagueness in the definitions, there is inconsistency in how these
factors are to be applied. For example, the National Bioethics Advisory Commis-
sion concluded that IFs should only be returned if they satisfy the criteria,
CAL MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE 72 (1999), available at http://bioethics.
georgetown.edu/nbac/hbm.pdf (relying on these factors); Fabsitz et al., supra note 33 (same); NHLBI
Working Group on Reporting Genetic Results in Research Studies, Meeting Summary, NAT’L HEART,
LUNG, & BLOOD INST. (July 12, 2004) [hereinafter NHLBI Working Group], http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/
meetings/workshops/gene-results.htm (same).
74. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 21, at 254 (“These guidelines, however, lack answers to important
questions, such as how the determination of clinical utility should be made.”).
75. See, e.g., Rothstein, supra note 72, at 21 (“Some options for disclosure would be that the results
have reproductive significance, diagnostic significance, or treatment significance.”).
76. Fabsitz et al., supra note 33, at 575–76.
77. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 21, at 229 (“[O]ne would plausibly be more motivated to actively
seek out or monitor information related to the disease such that, should future research determine that
certain behaviors or medications reduce the risk of contracting the disease, one would be better
positioned to take advantage of the new information.”).
78. See, e.g., Beskow & Burke, supra note 29, at 1 (“Although many agree that results should be
offered only when they have utility, opinions vary as to whether the line should be drawn at clinical
utility (that is, a proven therapeutic or preventive intervention is available), at personal utility (such as
for reproductive decision-making or life planning), or in recognition that some individuals will find the
information useful in and of itself (for example, through an enhanced sense of personal identity).”);
Bredenoord et al., supra note 29, at 45 (“The concept of clinical utility is also debated, because the
clinical utility of testing varies widely, depending on the magnitude of the risk, the accuracy of the risk
prediction, the potential for risk reduction, the efficacy of available interventions, and the implications
for the capacity of the individuals concerned to obtain health insurance.”).
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whereas in 2004, the NHLBI Working Group concluded that IFs should not be
withheld if they satisfied the criteria.79
The uncertainty in the way the factors are defined and applied has led some
to conclude that determinations about whether to return results should be made
on a case-by-case basis.80 The uncertainty has also led to ongoing efforts by a
number of advisory bodies to promulgate lists of which IFs ought to be
returned.81 Although preliminary data suggested that there may be a great deal
of consensus about the limited set of particular results that should be returned,82
as guidance documents have begun to take more concrete positions about what
should constitute an appropriate standard of care, the pushback has been
intense. For example, in 2013, the American College of Medical Genetics and
Genomics recommended that for clinical whole-genome sequencing, a limited
set of IFs should always be returned, without deference to individual patient or
clinician preferences or to patient age.83 This guidance document generated a
flurry of positive and negative responses, with critiques focusing on the move
away from a “right not to know” and the abandonment of seemingly settled
thoughts about the inappropriateness of testing minors for adult-onset condi-
tions.84 A contemporaneous publication from the European Society of Human
Genetics covered similar ground, although it offered a different set of recommen-
dations.85
By and large, scholars, practitioners, and advisory bodies agree that research-
ers have an ethical obligation to offer to return some IFs. The various frame-
works that have been offered to assess IFs are starting to converge around three
variables: validity, a significant health impact, and clinical actionability. But this
seeming consensus belies the vagueness and inconsistency in how these vari-
ables are defined and applied. The current thinking about when IFs ought to be
returned provides little practicable guidance to researchers.
79. NHLBI Working Group, supra note 73.
80. See, e.g., Beskow & Burke, supra note 29, at 1; Ravitsky & Wilfond, supra note 24, at 15
(“[T]he same result can therefore be handled differently in different studies.”).
81. See, e.g., Gliwa & Berkman, supra note 20, at 33 (“A number of groups have recently discussed
the possibility of building standard lists of variants that could or should be disclosed as incidental
findings . . . .”); Green et al., supra note 41, at 569 (providing a list of variants that must be disclosed in
the clinical context).
82. See, e.g., Gliwa & Berkman, supra note 20, at 36 (“Based on recent surveys, experts can agree
on only a handful of variants that should be routinely disclosed. One study found that 100% of genetic
specialists were in agreement in favor of disclosing to adults 21 conditions or genes classified as
‘known pathogenic mutations’ (more than 80% agreed on 64 conditions or genes).”).
83. See, e.g., id.
84. See, e.g., Susan M. Wolf, George J. Annas & Sherman Elias, Patient Autonomy and Incidental
Findings in Clinical Genomics, 340 SCI. 1049, 1049–50 (2013); Wylie Burke et al., Recommendations
for Returning Genomic Incidental Findings? We Need to Talk!, 15 GENETICS MED. 854 (Aug. 1, 2013),
http://www.nature.com/gim/journal/vaop/ncurrent/pdf/gim2013113a.pdf.
85. See generally Carla G. van El et al., Whole-Genome Sequencing in Health Care, 21 EUR. J. HUM.
GENETICS 580 (2013).
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D. CONCERNS ABOUT LEGAL LIABILITY
Despite the emerging majority view that researchers have an ethical obliga-
tion to return at least some IFs arising from genomic research, the practice of
returning IFs has developed more slowly and in a highly variable manner.
Rather than adopting comprehensive policies to determine whether, when, or
which IFs should be returned, some researchers have chosen to avoid the
problem, stating in informed consent documents that no individual results,
incidental or otherwise, will be returned.86 Others have not precluded the
possibility of return but have set forth policies indicating that IFs will be
returned under extraordinarily narrow circumstances. Many others have re-
mained silent in their consent forms about the entire concept of IFs. Even
researchers who conscientiously choose to return IFs often do not clearly define
the circumstances under which they will do so.87
This gap between the emerging majority view that some IFs ought to be
returned and the reality that IFs often are not returned—or are returned under a
variety of narrowly or ill-defined plans—has led to growing concern about
potential legal liability arising from a researcher’s failure to return IFs.88
Consider, for example, a heart disease researcher conducting whole-genome
sequencing who accidentally stumbles upon a finding that a participant has a
propensity to develop otherwise difficult-to-detect non-polyp-forming colon
cancer. Because the consent form clearly states that only results related to heart
disease will be returned (or perhaps because the consent form states that no
individual results will be returned whatsoever), the researcher does not disclose
the individual’s heightened risk of developing colon cancer. When that indi-
vidual later goes on to develop the disease and learns that she could have had a
better treatment prognosis with earlier notification, she could bring a lawsuit
against the researcher for failing to disclose the potentially lifesaving informa-
tion.
Although there is, as yet, no law on point,89 there is a growing sense that we
may be standing at the precipice of legal liability for failing to adequately return
86. See, e.g., Cho, supra note 9, at 280 (noting the “common practice among researchers to notify
participants during the informed consent process that no individual results will be disclosed, ‘inciden-
tal’ or otherwise”); Wolf et al., supra note 6, at 362 (noting that “researchers, Institutional Review
Boards (IRBs), and universities have been conducting research with no agreement that they have any
responsibility to address and report IFs”).
87. Robert Klitzman et al., Processes and Factors Involved in Decisions Regarding Return of
Incidental Genomic Findings in Research, GENETICS MED. (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.nature.com/gim/
journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/gim2013140a.html.
88. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 21, at 226 (“Although the bulk of the literature asserts that re-
searchers have a moral duty to disclose medically useful results, the question remains whether there
ought to be a corresponding legal duty.”).
89. See, e.g., id. at 231 (“The Common Rule does not, however, directly address the provision of
results to subjects.”); Wolf, supra note 12, at 436 (“There is no law directly on point. . . . To date, no
reported legal case has been discovered that addresses return of results or incidental findings in the
domain of research.”); Wolf et al., supra note 6, at 362 (“Current law and federal regulations offer no
direct guidance on how to deal with IFs in research . . . .”).
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IFs.90 Liability could arise from three situations: (1) failing to return IFs at all;
(2) returning some but not the ones that could prove critical; or (3) returning IFs
that turn out to be false positives that give rise to harms as a result of attempting
treatment. To the extent there continues to be a push towards an ethical
obligation to return at least some IFs, and to the extent offering to return IFs
develops into a research standard or custom, the ethical obligation to return IFs
could give rise to a legal duty.91 Although it is clear that ethics is not the law92
and that deriving the parameters of ethical obligations from concerns about
potential legal obligations can be inappropriate, the ethical debate should not
proceed unaware of the potential legal ramifications of advancing and implement-
ing an ethical obligation to return IFs.
II. POTENTIAL TORT LAW CLAIMS FOR FAILURE TO RETURN INCIDENTAL FINDINGS IN
GENOMIC RESEARCH
The discrepancy between the emerging ethical view that at least some IFs
should be returned and the reality that IFs are being returned inconsistently has
given rise to concerns about legal liability.93 There is growing concern that
research participants who later develop a disease that could have been predicted
may bring suit against the researcher who knew about the potential harm but did
not disclose it. Injured research participants could allege that, had they been
notified about their propensity to develop a disease, they would have taken
additional precautions to prevent or minimize the consequences.94
Because there is no case law directly addressing researchers’ legal obligations
90. See, e.g., Clayton & McGuire, supra note 12, at 476 (“One thing is certain—if these practices
become routine, they will be legally required. This is the way tort law has worked for decades.”); Wolf,
supra note 12, at 437 (“Yet already, we see views expressed that researchers must navigate between
legal threats on both sides—liability for failure to return findings on one side, and liability for wrongly
returning on the other.”); Wolf et al., supra note 6, at 365 (“Some recent case law suggests that a legal
trend may be emerging toward recognizing an obligation on the part of a researcher to provide a
research participant with information acquired from a study, when that information has clinical
implications for the participant.”).
91. See, e.g., Clayton & McGuire, supra note 12, at 473 (“Although commentators are careful to
distinguish this as an ethical rather than legal obligation, we worry that return of results may
unjustifiably become standard of care based on this growing ‘consensus,’ which could quickly lead to a
legal (negligence-based) duty to offer and return individualized genetic research results.”); Gordon,
supra note 21, at 260 (“But the common law has advanced such that the imposition of a researcher duty
to disclose individual research findings that are clinically useful to subjects appears to be a logical next
step.”).
92. See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 12, at 441 (“All of these papers present ethics recommendations. And
to date, not a single one of them appears to have been cited in any legal decision or used to impose
liability. There is a very good reason for this: ethics is not the same as law.”).
93. See supra section I.D.
94. There is also the possibility that research participants could bring suit alleging that a researcher
violated the “right not to know.” In other words, a researcher told them about a genetic predisposition
that they specifically disclaimed any interest in knowing more about. A claim alleging a violation of a
right not to know could proceed if a participant suffered injury, either emotional or physical, upon
learning information that a researcher had reason to know a participant would not want disclosed.
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to return IFs,95 plaintiffs bringing suit—and the courts hearing these cases—will
have to reason analogically to areas in which courts have considered liability
for failure to disclose. The discussion below examines possible tort law claims
for failing to return IFs.96 As a general rule, injured research participants will
almost always have difficulty recovering in tort. This is so, in part, because
informed consent documents have been viewed by courts as means by which
participants assume the risks of research, because the duties that researchers
owe are uncertain and have been held to be limited to compliance with federal
95. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 13.
96. Although a more detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, a participant who was not
told of an IF and who subsequently suffered injury would have even less of a chance of succeeding in a
lawsuit upon bringing a breach of contract or property claim. A research participant bringing a breach
of contract claim against a researcher for failing to return IFs could only succeed if the informed
consent document were treated as a contract and the informed consent document made clear that IFs
would be returned. Courts and scholars are divided about whether an informed consent document
should be treated as a contract. See, e.g., Dahl v. HEM Pharm. Corp., 7 F.3d 1399, 1404–05 (9th Cir.
1993) (interpreting participation in a medical trial as a contract); Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc.,
782 A.2d 807, 843–44 (Md. 2001) (finding that the consent form created a bilateral contract between
parties); Gordon, supra note 21, at 255 (“Informed consent documents have previously been treated as
binding contracts by courts . . . .”); Michelle N. Meyer, The Subject–Researcher Relationship: In
Defense of Contracting Around Default Rules, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Apr. 2011, at 27, 28 (“Courts have
increasingly held . . . that the research consent form constitutes a contract . . . .”). But see, e.g., Wash.
Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 674–77 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that the signed consent forms
demonstrated the donors’ intent to make a gift); Natalie Ram, Assigning Rights and Protecting
Interests: Constructing Ethical and Efficient Legal Rights in Human Tissue Research, 23 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 119, 163 (2009) (“Despite their frequent similarity in form to contracts, however, informed
consent documents, whether tiered or otherwise, are generally not considered to be contractual
documents.”); Richard S. Saver, At the End of the Clinical Trial: Does Access to Investigational
Technology End As Well?, 31 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 411, 428 (2009) (observing that some courts have
“treat[ed] the informed consent documents as merely notice of the subjects’ consent rather than an
enforceable contract”); Wolf et al., supra note 6, at 372 (“[C]ourts have generally been reluctant to find
binding contractual obligations in the research setting.”).
Research participants who are unsuccessful in bringing claims either in tort or for breach of contract
may try to bring claims alleging a property right in their genetic-research results. Individuals claiming
that they have a property right to information about themselves uncovered during research would
require courts to find that individuals retain ownership interests in the biological material that they have
contributed to research and the results derived there from—claims that courts have been unwilling to
recognize. See, e.g., Yael Bregman-Eschet, Genetic Databases and Biobanks: Who Controls Our
Genetic Privacy?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 22–26 (2006) (noting that, in a
number of cases, courts have not recognized an individual’s property rights in biological specimens
donated to research); Radhika Rao, Genes and Spleens: Property, Contract, or Privacy Rights in the
Human Body?, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 371, 372 (2007) (“There are three important cases in which
individuals have claimed ownership of their own bodies in the context of biomedical research. In all
three cases, the courts refused to accord property rights to those who supply body parts for medical
research . . . .”); Wolf et al., supra note 6, at 372 (“In Ande v. Rock, researchers conducted a cystic
fibrosis study on samples from newborns and did not inform parents of a newborn who tested positive
of the results. The parents claimed a property right to these test results and argued that if this
information had been disclosed, they could have avoided harm in two ways: they would have been able
to accept treatment for their child to lessen the severity and progression of her disease, and they would
have chosen not to have a second child who was also diagnosed with cystic fibrosis. None of their
claims to this information succeeded.”). It is therefore extremely unlikely that a research participant can
succeed in claiming that she has a property right in her genomic information that includes a derivative
right to obtain IFs.
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regulations, and because research interventions can result in injury even if no
one was at fault.97 Nevertheless, as additional voices call for an ethical obliga-
tion to return IFs, and as this emerging ethical obligation increasingly becomes
standard or customary practice in research, the emerging ethical obligation
could give rise to a legal obligation to return IFs, the failure of which could
result in legal liability.
A few illustrative examples of possible scenarios are set forth here and
analyzed throughout the section that follows. These examples set forth a num-
ber of factors that courts would likely consider under the current tort law
regime. Most notably for our analysis, we will discuss: (1) the extent of any
researcher–participant relationship; (2) the foreseeability and proximity of any
harm; and (3) the extent to which the harm uncovered is preventable.
Example 1 (Anesthesia Death): Having suffered a heart attack once before,
Arnold Adams is altruistically motivated to enroll in research to contribute to a
deeper understanding of the genetic causes of heart disease. Arnold is referred
by his heart specialist to Dr. Ames, a physician specializing in heart disease
research, for enrollment in Dr. Ames’s non-therapeutic research protocol.
Dr. Ames meets with Arnold and sequences Arnold’s entire genome. Dr. Ames
learns that Arnold has a rare variant that causes a potentially fatal outcome
should Arnold be exposed to a particular anesthesia that can be used in heart
surgery. Dr. Ames does not tell Arnold of this genetic variant. One month later,
Arnold goes into surgery for his heart condition, is given the anesthesia, and
dies.
Example 2 (De-Identified Data): Betsy Banks donates blood and agrees that
her blood can be used in research so long as no other identifying information is
provided. Dr. Bell, a Ph.D. scientist, is conducting research using de-identified
samples and notes that the blood marked Specimen X, Betsy’s blood, contains a
genetic marker for a predisposition to breast cancer. Unaware of her predisposi-
tion to breast cancer, and in accordance with clinical guidelines for those with
no predisposition to breast cancer, Betsy gets regular mammograms every two
years. The guidelines for those with a predisposition to breast cancer suggest
getting mammograms every year. In the second year following her mammo-
gram, Betsy develops breast cancer and ultimately succumbs to it.
Example 3 (Large-Scale Research): Cal Crawford decides to enroll in a
research study as a healthy research participant. Dr. Cruz, an oncologist, is
sequencing the whole genome of both healthy and sick research participants to
ascertain the underlying genetic causes of a particular cancer. The study is a
large-scale study with thousands of participants, none of whom Dr. Cruz meets
personally. In sequencing Cal’s whole genome, Dr. Cruz discovers that Cal’s
genome contains the ApoE gene, indicating a predisposition to Alzheimer’s
97. See, e.g., Elizabeth R. Pike, Recovering from Research: A No-Fault Proposal to Compensate
Injured Research Participants, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 27–29 (2012) (articulating the many reasons that
injured research participants will always have difficulty recovering in tort).
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disease. Dr. Cruz does not return this result to Cal. Fifteen years later, Cal
developes Alzheimer’s disease. Had Cal been told about his predisposition, he
would have monitored scientific developments about emerging ways to stave off
Alzheimer’s disease and might have made a different set of life choices.
The claim most likely to be brought by a participant in one of the above
scenarios is a tort law claim alleging negligence.98 To prove negligence, a
research participant must show: (1) that a researcher owed a duty to participants
to return IFs arising from research; (2) that the researcher breached the duty;
(3) that the breached duty was the “but for” and proximate cause of the
participant’s injury; and (4) that the participant suffered measurable harm.99 An
analysis of each of these elements is set forth below.
A. A LEGAL DUTY TO RETURN INCIDENTAL FINDINGS?
As a general rule, individuals owe a duty of reasonable care under the
circumstances.100 Absent particular circumstances, tort law imposes no affirma-
tive duties to act for another’s benefit,101 and individuals are not required to
warn others of impending harm.102 A number of factors can overcome this
general tort law notion that individuals do not owe others affirmative duties,
including: (1) special relationships;103 (2) contractual agreements to act in ways
98. See, e.g., Ram, supra note 96, at 156–57 (“In most cases, however, medical professionals who
fail to adequately disclose information material to decision making may be subject only to tort liability
under negligence.”).
99. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 124 (2d ed.
2011) (setting forth the elements of a tort law negligence claim); Ram, supra note 96, at 156–57 (same).
100. See, e.g., DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 99, § 125 (“The duty or standard imposed in
most cases is the duty of reasonable care under the circumstances, no more, no less.”).
101. See, e.g., id. (“It sounds surprising, but there are cases in which the defendant literally owes the
plaintiff no duty to exercise care to prevent the harm suffered by the plaintiff.”); Diane E. Hoffmann &
Karen H. Rothenberg, Whose Duty Is It Anyway?: The Kennedy Krieger Opinion and Its Implications
for Public Health Research, 6 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 109 (2002), 111–12 (“[T]he law provides that
there is ‘no duty to act affirmatively for the benefit of others in the absence of some special
relationship.’”).
102. See, e.g., Furman, supra note 13, at 400 (“Under common law, a person owes no duty to control
the conduct of another or to warn others of anticipated conduct.”). One such exception may occur in
cases where an individual created the risk of physical or emotional harm. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS § 18 (2010); Hoffmann & Rothenberg, supra note 101, at 111–12 (“In general, the law
holds that one has a duty to act reasonably to prevent physical harms to others that might result from
one’s affirmative acts. . . .”).
103. See, e.g., Pehle v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., Inc., 397 F.3d 897, 902 (10th Cir. 2005) (“A duty
arises when ‘a relation exists between the parties [such] that the community will impose a legal
obligation upon one for the benefit of the other . . . .’”); Stanley v. McCarver, 92 P.3d 849, 851 (Ariz.
2004) (“Duties may also arise from a special relationship between the parties . . . .”); DOBBS, HAYDEN &
BUBLICK, supra note 99, § 405 (“The exceptional circumstances in which a defendant may owe a duty
of reasonable assistance to a plaintiff include: . . . (2) the defendant is in a special relationship to the
plaintiff . . . .”); Furman, supra note 13, at 401 (“An exception to the common law rule exists when the
defendant has some special relationship with the person whose conduct needs to be controlled or is in a
relationship with a foreseeable victim of the conduct.”); Hoffmann & Rothenberg, supra note 101,
at 113 (“However, when individuals are in a special relationship, courts have often imposed a different
level of duty.”).
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that differ from common law presumptions;104 (3) particular undertakings by
either party;105 and (4) particular skills, training, and ability.106 Analysis of each
of these factors, and the extent to which they give rise to tort law duties to warn,
is context specific.
1. The Fiduciary Duty of Physicians to Return Findings
The medical profession with the most clearly articulated and legally recog-
nized duties is that of physicians providing medical care to patients.107 The
heightened duty owed by physicians is a duty to comply with medical customs
or standards.108 In other words, physicians have an obligation to act using the
same skill, knowledge, and care possessed and exercised by comparable physi-
cians.109 Physicians providing medical care owe a fiduciary duty to their
patients, which entails a duty to act in the patient’s best interest.110 As articu-
lated by Professors Thomas L. Hafemeister and Selina Spinos:
Because physicians have superior medical knowledge and skill and are the
gatekeepers to medical services, patients are dependent on them. Patients lack
the knowledge or skill to assess their own health conditions. Instead, they
must depend on their physicians to provide critical information about their
medical well-being. . . . Because patients are so vulnerable and dependent on
their physicians, the law imposes a “trust” on doctors—a fiduciary responsibil-
ity stemming from the dependence and vulnerability of the patient, and from
the disparity between a patient’s and a physician’s knowledge and ability to
act.111
104. See, e.g., Hoffmann & Rothenberg, supra note 101, at 112 (“As regards a contractual agree-
ment, an individual may be liable for harms based on actions he or she promised via contract to perform
but failed to carry out.”).
105. See, e.g., id. § 410 (“The general rule that undertakings can create a duty of care is often
expressed by saying one who voluntarily assumes a duty must then perform that duty with reasonable
care.”).
106. See, e.g., id. § 127 (“The defendant’s conduct can thus be compared to the conduct we would
expect of a reasonable person having, say, certain knowledge and ability.”).
107. See, e.g., id. § 284 (“Under traditional rules, physicians owe a duty of care set by the custom of
their profession rather than a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances.”).
108. See, e.g., id. § 283 (“The duty to patients under the traditional legal rule is not the familiar duty
of reasonable care but the duty to comply with medical customs or medical standards that supposedly
dictate the exact methods by which a medical procedure is carried out.”).
109. See, e.g., id. § 292 (“The medical standard is sometimes stated by saying that physicians must
exercise at least the skill, knowledge, and care normally possessed and exercised by other members of
their profession in the same school of practice in the relevant medical community.”).
110. See, e.g., Leslie A. Meltzer, Undesirable Implications of Disclosing Individual Genetic Results
to Research Participants, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Nov./Dec. 2006, at 28, 29 (“[P]hysicians are fiduciaries to
their patients. This means that physicians have not only an ethical, but also a legal duty to act solely for
the benefit of their patients.”); Meyer, supra note 96, at 28 (“Generally, a fiduciary is someone who
voluntarily agrees to promote the best interests of another; who is given considerable discretion in so
acting since what will best promote the beneficiary’s interests cannot be spelled out in advance . . . .”).
111. Thomas L. Hafemeister & Selina Spinos, Lean on Me: A Physician’s Fiduciary Duty to
Disclose an Emergent Medical Risk to the Patient, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1167, 1186–87 (2009).
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A fiduciary duty to act in the patient’s best interest means that physicians
must disclose unexpected findings that indicate potential future harm, even if
these findings fall outside of the physician’s particular area of expertise.112
Failure to properly disclose unexpected findings can lead to tort liability and
damage awards to patients.113
Were a researcher to be treated like a physician, a researcher—like a physi-
cian—would have a duty to return IFs. But researchers qua researchers are not
generally thought to owe fiduciary duties, despite often having similar knowl-
edge, skills, and abilities as physicians. In critically important ways, a re-
searcher is not given the flexibility to act in a participant’s best interest114 and
thus cannot be a fiduciary.115 Researchers, therefore, owe participants some-
thing less than a fiduciary duty. Courts assessing claims that researchers failed
to appropriately return IFs should not find a treating physician’s duty to disclose
dispositive unless a researcher was actually or effectively acting as a treating
physician in addition to acting as a researcher.
2. Third-Party Physicians’ Duty to Return Findings
The area of established case law that more closely resembles the researcher-
participant relationship is the body of case law dealing with third-party physi-
cians. Third-party physicians are physicians hired by employers or insurance
companies to conduct physical examinations to determine whether an individual
has any disqualifying or costly health problems.116 Because, like researchers,
112. See, e.g., Furman, supra note 13, at 409 (“To recover for a failure to disclose under the rules of
professional malpractice, the plaintiff must show that the physician violated his or her duty to inform.
In addition, the plaintiff must show that the physician’s nondisclosure caused a recognizable harm
under the law of negligence.”); Hafemeister & Spinos, supra note 111, at 1169–70; Miller, Mello &
Joffe, supra note 29, at 279 (“Whereas failure to look for incidental findings would constitute
malpractice for radiologists engaged in medical practice, we contend that the duty of investigators is
more limited, owing to the nature of clinical research as distinct from medical care.”).
Doctors have even been found to owe a duty to relatives of the patients who would be affected by the
findings. See, e.g., Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So.2d 278, 281–82 (Fla. 1995) (finding that a physician owed a
duty to warn patient of genetic condition that could be passed on to child); Safer v. Estate of Pack,
677 A.2d 1188, 1192 (N.J. Super. 1996) (same). The implications of Safer were subsequently over-
turned by a genetic-privacy statute in New Jersey.
113. See, e.g., Hafemeister & Spinos, supra note 111, at 1198 (“A patient who has not received
adequate disclosure . . . merits both equitable relief and compensatory damages for resulting economic
and noneconomic injuries.”); Meltzer, supra note 110, at 29 (“In the personal context of the physician–
patient relationship, fundamental ethical principles compel physicians to share individual genetic
results with patients. In fact, failure to share such information in all but the most exceptional
circumstances is legally actionable . . . .”).
114. See, e.g., Elizabeth R. Pike, Recovering from Research: A No-Fault Proposal to Compensate
Injured Research Participants, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 12 (2012) (“In fact, many elements of research—
placebo-controlled trials, random assignment to treatment arms, restricted flexibility in adjusting
dosages, restrictions on using concomitant medications—are contrary to good medical care.”).
115. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 21, at 245 (“Others, however, posit that the relationship cannot be
fiduciary because the researcher’s primary loyalty is to his protocol rather than to any one subject.”).
116. See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 99, § 286 (defining a third party doctor as a
“physician or other professional [who] may be employed to examine prospective employees, prospec-
tive insureds, or litigation claimants”).
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third-party physicians do not provide clinical care to patients, they are similarly
thought not to owe fiduciary duties to examinees.
Nevertheless, third-party physicians have the knowledge, skills, and ability to
make medical assessments; are privy to private health information about the
examinee; are uniquely positioned to discover preventable harms; and may
develop a special relationship with the examinee.117 A number of courts have
therefore held that third-party physicians have a duty to return unexpected
findings to the individuals being examined, even absent a fiduciary relation-
ship.118
For example, in Stanley v. McCarver, a third-party physician evaluated a
chest x-ray of Ms. Stanley as part of a pre-employment tuberculosis screen-
ing.119 Dr. McCarver recognized that the x-ray showed particular abnormalities,
yet these abnormalities were not disclosed to Ms. Stanley by her prospective
employer, in violation of their company policy.120 Approximately ten months
later, Ms. Stanley was diagnosed with lung cancer and brought suit against
Dr. McCarver, his employer, and her prospective employer alleging a negligent
failure to “timely and adequately diagnose and/or communicate to [her] the
abnormality evident on her chest x-ray.”121 The court noted that “Dr. McCarver
did agree, for consideration, to interpret Ms. Stanley’s confidential medical
record” and that “[b]y doing so, he undertook a professional obligation with
respect to Ms. Stanley’s physical well being.”122 The Court concluded that
“Dr. McCarver placed himself in a unique position to prevent future harm to
Ms. Stanley” and that Ms. Stanley could have “reasonably expect[ed] the
physician to sound the alarm if any serious abnormality [was] discovered.”123
117. See, e.g., id. § 286 (“[S]ome authority has expressly held that a doctor who actually examines a
patient or reads his X-rays owes a duty of reasonable care which may require both care in making a
diagnosis and reasonable care in notifying the patient of serious medical conditions within the scope of
the examination he has undertaken. If the physician has undertaken to provide care to a person or
created a reasonable expectation that he would do so, then delivery of such care to should be the order
of the day, whether that person is characterized as a patient or not.”); Gordon, supra note 21, at 239
(“Numerous courts have now held that, despite the traditional rule, physicians conducting employment-
related physical examinations of employees (prospective or current) at the behest of employers have a
duty to reveal important medical information discovered during the course of the examination to the
examinee.”).
118. See, e.g., Stanley v. McCarver, 92 P.3d 849, 853 (Ariz. 2004) (“[I]n placing oneself in the hands
of a medical professional, even at the request of one’s employer or insurer, one may have a reasonable
expectation that the expert will warn of any incidental dangers of which he is cognizant due to his
peculiar knowledge of his specialization.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Reed v. Bojarski, 764
A.2d 433, 443 (N.J. 2001) (“[T]he patient is entitled to rely on the physician to tell him of a potential
serious illness if it is discovered. Any reasonable person would expect that and the duty to communicate
with a patient who is found to be ill is non-delegable.”); Meinze v. Holmes, 532 N.E.2d 170, 173–74
(Oh. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that third-party doctors had a duty to communicate a significant risk of
danger to the plaintiff, even in the absence of a doctor–patient relationship).
119. Stanley, 92 P.3d at 849.
120. Id. at 851.
121. Id. (alteration in original)
122. Id. at 853.
123. Id.
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In the case of Reed v. Bojarski, the New Jersey Supreme Court also decided
that third-party physicians can owe duties to their examinees even outside a
traditional physician–patient relationship.124 As part of a pre-employment physi-
cal conducted by Dr. Bojarski, Arnold Reed underwent a chest x-ray that
revealed a widened mediastinum, known to be a potential indicator of Hodgkin’s
Lymphoma.125 In violation of the terms of the contract, Dr. Bojarski never
notified Reed’s potential employer about his potentially dangerous condition,
and Reed’s potential employer responded to Reed that he was in good health.126
About six months later, Reed returned for another examination, having already
lost twenty-five pounds and suffering from flu-like symptoms.127 A month
following that, Reed was admitted to the hospital and diagnosed with Stage IIB
Hodgkin’s disease.128 Reed died eight months after his initial examination at
the age of twenty-eight.129 The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that
Dr. Bojarski owed Reed a duty of reasonable care and that in light of the
evaluative purpose of the exam, Reed “had an absolute right to expect that he
would be told if something was wrong.”130
Like the third-party physicians in Stanley and Reed, researchers will also
have access to a patient’s confidential medical record and may also be in a
unique position to prevent harm. Although a researcher does not accept mon-
etary consideration from research participants, a court could conclude that
researchers have a similar duty to “sound the alarm” if any serious abnormality
is discovered.
3. A Researcher’s Duty to Return Findings?
As a general rule, researchers are not fiduciaries of participants, so they do
not owe fiduciary duties to act in a participant’s best interest.131 Courts that
have considered the duties that researchers owe to participants have generally
found that researchers have a legal duty to comply with the federal regulations
governing research.132 The regulations are silent about how researchers must
124. Reed v. Bojarski, 764 A.2d 433, 441 (N.J. 2001).
125. Id. at 435.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 445.
131. See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 110, at 29 (“Investigators are not fiduciaries of research
participants, and as such, do not presently have a legal obligation to act in the best interests of
participants.”).
132. See, e.g., Whitlock v. Duke Univ., 637 F. Supp. 1463, 1471 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (holding that the
federal research regulations provided the standard of care), aff’d, 829 F.2d 1340 (4th Cir. 1987); Daum
v. SpineCare Med. Grp., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 260, 273 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (same); Vodopest v.
MacGregor, 913 P.2d 779, 787 (Wash. 1996) (same); Roger L. Jansson, Researcher Liability for
Negligence in Human Subject Research: Informed Consent and Researcher Malpractice Actions, 78
WASH. L. REV. 229, 247 (2003) (“[T]here appears to be an emerging trend among courts to use the
federal regulations as the standard of care for informed consent in human subject research.”).
820 [Vol. 102:795THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
handle IFs.133
The question then is what level of responsiveness to an IF would satisfy a
researcher’s duty of care. Is a researcher’s duty discharged merely by returning
results that the researcher stumbles upon? Or is a researcher obligated to look
for IFs?134 Is a researcher’s duty time limited? That is, must a researcher report
only those IFs that are known or validated by today’s science? Or is a researcher
obligated to continually reexamine the whole-genome-sequence data in light of
new, emerging science—an approach that would undoubtedly be burdensome?
Existing legal doctrine provides no clear answers.
Ultimately, a researcher’s duty to return IFs will turn on whether researchers
are treated more like physicians, who have a duty to comply with medical
customs and standards,135 or more like third-party physicians, who have a duty
of reasonable care under the circumstances taking into account a number of
factors.
If a researcher owes a duty comparable to that owed by a physician—a duty
to act in accordance with the customs and standards of comparable research-
ers—a court would be unlikely to conclude that researchers owe a duty of care
to return IFs.136 At present, there is too much inconsistency among researchers
At least one leading case, Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., has concluded that a researcher’s
obligations may extend significantly beyond the federal regulations. 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001). The
Supreme Court of Maryland noted that research can, and normally will, give rise to special relation-
ships that obligate researchers beyond the general tort law duty not to cause injury. Id. at 834–35. This
special relationship arises, in part, because “investigators are in a better position to anticipate, discover,
and understand the potential risks to the health of their subjects.” Id. at 851. Several scholars have
expressed concern about the implication of Grimes in the context of IFs—that Grimes indicates “that a
legal trend may be emerging toward recognizing an obligation on the part of a researcher to provide a
research participant with information acquired from a study, when that information has clinical
implications for the participant.” Wolf et al., supra note 6, at 365. To the extent Grimes is extended or
followed in other courts, a court could conclude that researchers have a legal duty to return IFs in
certain circumstances. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 21, at 234. But courts that have considered similar
fact patterns have generally refused to extend the holding of Grimes, and Grimes has been the subject
of significant scholarly criticism. See, e.g., Hoffmann & Rothenberg, supra note 101, at 147.
133. See, e.g., DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 99, § 249 (“Most statutes and even regulations
are relatively permanent and relatively abstract; they cannot take into account the particular concerns of
individual cases. They aim at minimum standards but are not meant to establish the outer limits of the
defendant’s safety responsibilities.”).
134. Assuming that there is an obligation to disclose findings that have been discovered during
research, some may question whether researchers have an obligation to purposefully investigate
sequence data in search of IFs. See, e.g., Gliwa & Berkman, supra note 20, at 33. It is unreasonable to
expect that researchers will spend excessive resources—measured both in time and money—looking
extensively for all manner of IFs. If there is an obligation to look, then it must be only for information
that is extremely well-validated and useful for mitigating serious disease. Id. Furthermore, the process
of looking for IFs cannot be so difficult as to seriously undermine a researcher’s ability to produce
generalizable knowledge that can lead to social benefit.
135. See, e.g., DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 99, § 283 (“The duty to patients under the
traditional legal rule is not the familiar duty of reasonable care but the duty to comply with medical
customs or medical standards that supposedly dictate the exact methods by which a medical procedure
is carried out.”).
136. See, e.g., id. § 292 (“The medical standard is often understood to be the medical custom or
practice with respect to the particular act of diagnosis or treatment. . . . Practically speaking, the
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concerning the return of IFs for any custom to develop.137 Similarly, although
courts can use guidance documents as evidence of a duty owed,138 the current
guidance as to which IFs should be returned in which circumstances is too
varied and has yet to reach a level of consensus. Accordingly, it is too soon for
these guidance documents to give rise to a researcher’s duty.139 Once a consen-
sus does emerge, courts in some states would look to these guidance documents
as evidence of a standard of care.140
To the extent that a researcher’s duty of care is determined like that of a
third-party physician, a court would look to a number of factors to determine
whether a researcher acted reasonably under the circumstances. For example, a
court may consider: (1) whether the researcher was in a unique position to
prevent harm, (2) the burden of preventing harm, (3) whether the plaintiff
relied upon the researcher’s diagnosis or interpretation, (4) the closeness of the
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, (5) the
degree of certainty that the plaintiff has suffered or will suffer harm,
(6) the skill or special reputation of the actors, (7) the scope of any agreement,
and (8) public policy.141
Our Example 1 (Anesthesia Death) presents a strong case for a researcher
having a duty to return the particular IF. In Example 1, Dr. Ames was one of the
few people who knew or could have known about Arnold’s vulnerability to a
particular anesthesia and was therefore in a unique position to prevent harm; the
burden of preventing the harm through notification was likely to be low given
standard can be the custom or practice of the relevant medical community, or it can be a qualified
expert’s opinion that does not refer to custom or practice at all and may not even refer to any source.”).
137. See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 12, at 442 (“We would all be kidding ourselves to believe that we
had already generated such consensus across the research community about return of results and
incidental findings and such specificity about what return should look like that courts would find an
established standard of care. The reality is that debate, research, and specification are very obviously
works in progress.”).
138. See, e.g., Stanley v. McCarver, 92 P.3d 849, 854 n.6 (Ariz. 2004). (“While rules of professional
conduct may provide evidence of how a professional would act, they do not create a duty or establish a
standard of care as a matter of law.”); DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 99, § 295 (“Quite apart
from statute, some courts have accepted evidence of such guidelines as sufficient to establish the
standard of care in favor of the plaintiff.”).
139. See supra section I.C.
140. See, e.g., Stanley v. McCarver, 92 P.3d 849, 854 n.6 (Ariz. 2004) (“We continue to believe,
however, that while such rules may illuminate the standard of care, they do not serve as a basis on
which to impose a duty.”); DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 99, § 295 (“In addition, the reasons
to say that compliance with statutes and regulations should not be taken to show conclusively that the
defendant exercised due care apply as well to compliance with medical protocols. There is room . . . for
healthy scepticism about their value as ultimate tests of liability or non-liability.”).
141. See Stanley, 92 P.3d at 853; see also DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 99, § 410 (“A
person who undertakes actions that would increase physical safety for the plaintiff is under a duty to
use reasonable care to carry out his undertaking, but only if one of two conditions [are] met . . . (1) that
the defendant’s failure to exercise reasonable care increased the risk of harm . . . or (2) that the plaintiff
relied on the undertaking.”); Miller, Mello & Joffe, supra note 29, at 272–73 (“[T]he patient likely
expects that the physician will disclose all health-related findings, an expectation that might lead to
‘reliance’ behaviors on the patient’s part—that is, the patient may rely, to his detriment, on the
physician’s decision to remain silent.”).
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that the Dr. Ames and Arnold had already met, and there was a high degree of
certainty that Arnold would suffer harm. Without more information, however,
we cannot determine the extent to which Arnold relied on Dr. Ames’s offer to
return IFs.
Example 2 (De-Identified Data) or Example 3 (Large-Scale Research) present
much weaker cases. In neither of the cases was the researcher in a position to
prevent harm. In Example 2, this is because Betsy’s data was shared without
identifying information, and in Example 3, this is because Alzheimer’s disease
is currently unpreventable and untreatable. In both examples, the burden of
preventing harm through notification could be quite high given that these
examples both involve research with large numbers of participants.
Nevertheless, it is not entirely clear how a court would rule given the
context-specific nature of this analysis. Although this context-specific approach
is a fundamental aspect of tort law, it provides very limited guidance to re-
searchers about when they can expect tort law duties to attach. And a fact- and
context-specific approach is particularly problematic in cases in which the
ethical and scientific analysis is evolving and uncertain. Though it is not clear
that a court today would find a researcher’s duty of reasonable care to include a
duty to notify participants about IFs, a continuing push for an ethical obligation
to return IFs, guidance documents that advocate returning IFs in particular
circumstances,142 and movement towards returning more IFs in practice could
foreseeably give rise to a legal duty to return IFs in the future.143
B. WAS THE DUTY BREACHED?
Assuming courts find that researchers owe participants a duty to return some
IFs, assessing whether the duty has been breached is no simple matter and may,
in fact, raise more questions than answers.144 Merely concluding that individu-
als have a duty to return particular findings does not, however, mean that the
duty has been breached.145 The issue of whether a duty was breached is in most
cases a question for a jury.146
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has addressed the issue of when a
third-party physician’s failure to notify examinees should be considered a
breach of a duty owed. In Pehle v. Farm Bureau Life Insurance Co., a husband
142. See, e.g., Green, supra note 41, at 569.
143. See, e.g., Clayton & McGuire, supra note 12, at 475 (“However, if guidelines suggest there is
an ethical obligation to offer results and investigators adopt this practice widely, both could be used as
evidence of what is the standard of care for investigators.”).
144. See, e.g., DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 99, § 253 (“The duty issue is whether there is
a standard the defendant must meet in his conduct; the breach issue is whether the defendant violated
that standard.”).
145. See, e.g., id. § 286 (“Given a duty of care, however, the question remains whether, in any given
case, he has breached that duty.”).
146. See, e.g., id. § 125 (“Juries, not judges, decide whether the defendant was negligent unless the
question is too clear to permit different evaluations by reasonable people.”).
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and wife applied to Farm Bureau for life insurance.147 Blood tests conducted in
1999 revealed that both husband and wife were HIV positive.148 The laboratory
testing company notified both Farm Bureau and the state department of health,
as required by law.149 Farm Bureau notified the couple that their application for
insurance was being denied based on the results of their blood test and offered
to send the blood-test results to their physician upon written authorization.150
The couple made no such request until the wife developed symptoms of AIDS
in 2001.151
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that “the trust and confidence
that the [couple] put in Farm Bureau was sufficient to create a relationship
giving rise to a limited duty”152 and that “if an insurance company, through
independent investigation by it or a third party for purposes of determining
policy eligibility, discovers that an applicant is infected with HIV, the company
has a duty to disclose to the applicant information sufficient to cause a reason-
able applicant to inquire further.”153 Despite this heightened duty, the Tenth
Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the laboratory, while concluding
that whether Farm Bureau satisfied its duty was a genuine issue of material
fact.154
In the context of researchers who conduct whole-genome sequencing,
adopting a standard that researchers have a duty to disclose to the participant
“information sufficient to cause a reasonable [participant] to inquire further”
would not settle the issue.155 Unlike researchers, third-party physicians have a
duty to thoroughly investigate the examinee and are tasked with discovering
health problems that are well-characterized and understood. Researchers, by
contrast, can potentially find thousands of IFs of which the meaning and import
could be unknown. Even those IFs that are well-characterized and understood
often only indicate a probability of developing disease and are much less
definitive than a clear diagnosis of HIV.
C. DID THE BREACHED DUTY CAUSE INJURY?
A successful tort lawsuit generally requires that the defendant’s conduct be
both the “but for” and proximate cause of the plaintiff’s harm.156 Under a
conventional causation analysis, participants alleging a researcher’s failure to
147. 397 F.3d 897, 899 (10th Cir. 2005).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 904.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 905.
155. Id. at 904.
156. See, e.g., DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 99, § 125 (“The traditional view is that the
plaintiff’s injury is caused by the defendant’s conduct if, but for the defendant’s conduct, the plaintiff
would have escaped the injury.”).
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appropriately return IFs will have difficulty showing that the researcher’s failure
to return IFs was the direct cause of their injury; the but-for cause will always
be the disease resulting from the underlying variant.157 Courts have nevertheless
recognized the legal doctrine “loss of a chance,” which acknowledges that the
possibility of preventing a medical misfortune is itself a valuable thing158 and
that the diminution of a chance to prevent or minimize future harm should be
compensated if it results from a medical professional’s failure.159
Loss-of-a-chance doctrine speaks to both the causation and injury elements of
a tort law claim. Although causation and injury are generally considered sepa-
rately,160 loss-of-a-chance redefines the interest that was injured (the chance of
recovering or preventing injury rather than the ultimate outcome)161 and then
considers whether the medical professional’s action was the but-for cause of the
lost chance.162
Although loss-of-a-chance is a relatively recent doctrine, it has started to
make inroads in state courts and has been adopted in nearly half of all states.163
157. See, e.g., Sawlani v. Mills, 830 N.E.2d 932, 938 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“No matter how
negligent the doctor’s performance, it can never be the proximate cause of the patient’s death. Since the
evidence establishes that it is more likely than not that the medical problem will kill the patient, the
disease or injury would always be the cause-in-fact.” (quoting Mayhue v. Sparkman, 653 N.E.2d 1384,
1387 (Ind. 1995))); Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts
Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1358 (1981) (“The
disease was obviously a cause of the harm. The doctor’s negligence in allowing the disease to progress
may also have caused harm.”).
158. See, e.g., Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 823 (Mass. 2008) (“[T]he loss of chance
doctrine views a person’s prospects for surviving a serious medical condition as something of value,
even if the possibility of recovery was less than even prior to the physician’s tortious conduct.”);
DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 99, § 196 (“The idea is that the plaintiff’s chance of survival
itself has value for which compensation is due.”); King, supra note 157, at 1354 (“[T]he loss of a
chance of achieving a favorable outcome or of avoiding an adverse consequence should be compen-
sable and should be valued appropriately.”).
159. See, e.g., Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 823 (“Where a physician’s negligence reduces or elimi-
nates the patient’s prospects for achieving a more favorable medical outcome, the physician has harmed
the patient and is liable for damages.”); King, supra note 157, at 1354 (noting that when “preexisting
conditions have not absolutely preordained an adverse outcome, however, the chance of avoiding it
should be appropriately compensated even if that chance is not better than even”).
160. See, e.g., King, supra note 157, at 1363 (“What caused a loss, however, should be a separate
question from what the nature and extent of the loss are.”).
161. See, e.g., Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 832 (noting that injury “consists of the diminished
likelihood of achieving a more favorable medical outcome”).
162. See, e.g., Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 832 (“[W]e recognize loss of chance not as a theory of
causation, but as a theory of injury. . . . In order to prove loss of chance, a plaintiff must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the physician’s negligence caused the plaintiff’s likelihood of
achieving a more favorable outcome to be diminished.”); Sawlani, 830 N.E.2d at 939 (“We think that
loss of chance is better understood as a description of the injury . . . .”); King, supra note 157, at 1360
(arguing that the medical professional should be liable to the extent that he “contributed to the harm by
allowing a preexisting condition to progress”).
163. See, e.g., Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 828 (“[A] substantial and growing majority of the States
that have considered the question have indorsed the loss of chance doctrine, in one form or another,
in medical malpractice actions.”); DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 99, § 196 (“Although a
significant number of states have specifically rejected the lost chance approach, an even larger number
has embraced it. A recent article places the count at 16 states against the doctrine and 22 in favor.”).
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The loss-of-a-chance doctrine is viewed as being more in accord with the ideals
of tort law generally. Without loss of a chance, any situation in which an
individual had less than a fifty percent chance of recovering would be wholly
immunized from tort liability.164
Thus far, loss-of-a-chance has been applied primarily in the context of
medical malpractice,165 but the doctrine could be applied more broadly.166 One
reason that the loss-of-a-chance doctrine has been used in medical malpractice
is that “reliable expert evidence establishing loss of chance is more likely to be
available in a medical malpractice case than in some other domains of tort
law.”167 Second, “it is not uncommon for patients to have a less than even
chance of survival or of achieving a better outcome when they present them-
selves for diagnosis, so the shortcomings of the all or nothing rule are particu-
larly widespread.”168 Third, the “failure to recognize loss of chance in medical
malpractice actions forces the party who is the least capable of preventing the
harm to bear the consequences of the more capable party’s negligence.”169
Some of the factors that justify application of loss-of-a-chance to medical
malpractice also support applying the doctrine to research. First, the same
reliable expert evidence about the chances of succumbing to, for example,
undisclosed breast cancer in a medical malpractice case could also be provided
in the research context. Second, the same diseases for which individuals may
have a less-than-even chance of survival could occur in both the medical and
164. See, e.g., Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 829–30 (“[T]he all or nothing rule provides a ‘blanket
release from liability for doctors and hospitals any time there was less than a 50 percent chance
of survival, regardless of how flagrant the negligence.’”); DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 99,
§ 196 (“In such cases, however, the evidence may show that even if diagnosis and treatment had been
timely, the patient might have had only a 40% chance of living. On those facts, the plaintiff definitely
could not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant caused the patient’s death.”);
David A. Fischer, Tort Recovery for Loss of a Chance, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 605, 611 (2001) (“Loss
of a chance is often justified in these cases because the physician breached a duty to protect the patient
from the preexisting condition, and the patient would have placed high value on the chance of a cure
even if it was less than 50 percent.”).
165. See, e.g., Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 823 (“Permitting recovery for loss of chance is particu-
larly appropriate in the area of medical negligence. Our decision today is limited to such claims.”);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 cmt. n (2010) (“To date, the courts that have accepted lost
opportunity as cognizable harm have almost universally limited its recognition to medical-malpractice
cases.”); Fischer, supra note 164, at 610 (“These courts typically apply the doctrine in medical
malpractice cases where the physician improperly diagnoses or treats a disease.”); Wolf et al., supra
note 6, at 371–72 (“Many state courts allow recovery for ‘loss of a chance,’ especially in medical
contexts.”).
166. See, e.g., DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 99, § 196 (“Although most cases debating lost
chance recovery are patterned on the physician example, where a preexisting condition plays a major
role, the legal issues could occur in any kind of case where evidence fails to show causation more
probably than not.”); Wolf et al., supra note 6, at 371–72 (noting that loss of a chance “can be applied
more broadly” and that “[a] number of courts have used the doctrine to allow recovery for ‘failure to
protect a person from a pre-existing condition’” (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 (2005);
Fischer, supra note 164, at 610)).
167. Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 834–35.
168. See id. at 835.
169. See id.
826 [Vol. 102:795THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
research contexts. Third, as with medical malpractice, the failure to recognize
loss-of-a-chance in the research context forces the party who may be the least
capable of preventing the harm to bear its consequences.
Some reasons used to justify loss-of-a-chance in the context of medical
malpractice are not similarly applicable in research. Courts have looked to the
specific physician–patient relationship—particularly the expectation that “the
physician will take every reasonable measure to obtain an optimal outcome for
the patient”—as warranting these additional protections.170 Such expectations
are generally not justifiable in research, and courts should be cautious before
imposing additional burdens on researchers that were specifically disclaimed
during the informed consent process. Moreover, courts have justified loss-of-a-
chance in the context of medical malpractice because “reasonably good empiri-
cal evidence is often available about the general statistical probability of the lost
opportunity.”171 In research, where so much is unknown, this simply may not be
true. Certain IFs, such as those unlikely to be uncovered by other means, would
be more likely to lead to recovery under loss-of-a-chance principles than would
others. Example 1, introduced at the outset of this section, presents just such a
case. Other IFs, such as the possibility of developing breast cancer or Alz-
heimer’s disease in the future (Examples 2 and 3), may be less likely to satisfy
this criterion.172
A research participant must also show that the researcher’s conduct was the
proximate cause of the participant’s harm—“that the harm was the general kind
that was unreasonably risked by the defendant, the kind of harm the defendant
should have been more careful to avoid.”173 Whether harm is foreseeable turns
“on what facts the defendant actually knew or those he should have known.”174
Regardless of whether the other elements, including but-for causation, have
been satisfied, one could argue that in each of the examples set forth at the
outset, the harm that materialized was precisely the harm predicted by the
IF: Arnold’s reaction to the particular anesthesia, Betsy developing breast
cancer, and Cal developing Alzheimer’s disease were all probabilistically
foretold by the particular variants discovered. But these cases may be among
the easiest examples. In other cases, the proximate cause analysis is far less
straightforward.
In many, if not most, cases, the IF will be of unknown significance so
that any harm that occurs would not be foreseeable. In other cases, the risk
170. See id.
171. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 cmt. n (2010).
172. See, e.g., Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 826 (“Finkel told the jury that if Birnbaum had ordered the
appropriate testing on Matsuyama in 1995, the cancer ‘would have been diagnosed’ and ‘treated in a
timely fashion when it might still have been curable.’ As a result of Birnbaum’s failure to make a timely
diagnosis, Finkel opined, the cancer metastasized to an advanced, inoperable phase, resulting in
Matsuyama’s premature death.”).
173. See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 99, § 125.
174. See, e.g., id. § 159.
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could foreseeably be discovered through routine medical tests, and thus the
harm would not be foreseeably likely to occur. In all cases, an IF arising from
genomic research only gives rise to a probabilistic chance of harm occurring
that may or may not be sufficiently proximate.
For the reasons discussed above, even a research participant able to prove
negligence will have a difficult time proving causation. An injured participant
could only succeed in a state that has adopted the loss-of-a-chance doctrine, and
in a court that is willing to extend the doctrine from medical malpractice to
research. Even then, an injured research participant could recover only if the
researcher’s failure to disclose was the but-for and proximate cause of the
participant’s injury—a claim that, in most circumstances, will be quite difficult
to prove.
D. IS THE PARTICIPANT’S INJURY COMPENSABLE?
A final requirement for a successful tort lawsuit is that a plaintiff suffer
actual, compensable harm.175 In the context of loss-of-a-chance, the plaintiff
is entitled to recover only the value of the chance that was destroyed.176 An
injured participant’s damages are determined “by subtracting the decedent’s
postnegligence chance of survival from the prenegligence chance of sur-
vival.”177 Thus, if an injured research participant had only a forty percent
chance of surviving a potentially disclosed IF and the researcher’s negligence
deprived the participant of that chance entirely, the researcher would be liable
for forty percent of the total damages suffered.178
In Example 3, Cal’s recovery for loss-of-a-chance would approach zero
percent because given today’s treatment options, Cal would have had no chance
of preventing his Alzheimer’s disease regardless of what Dr. Cruz disclosed. In
Example 1, Arnold’s recovery would be close to one hundred percent because
Dr. Ames’s failure to notify Arnold wholly removed his chance to use a
different anesthesia during surgery. Betsy’s recovery in Example 2 would fall
somewhere between these two extremes because she would have had a better
175. See, e.g., id. § 120 (“A third characteristic of negligence cases can be seen in the rule that no
claim for negligence will be recognized unless the plaintiff suffers actual harm.”).
176. See, e.g., Pipe v. Hamilton, 56 P.3d 823, 827 (Kan. 2002) (“The proportional damage approach
ensures that a plaintiff recovers only the loss attributable to the loss of chance and not for an arbitrary
amount awarded by the jury or for the total damages sustained.”); DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra
note 99, § 196 (“Under the value of the chance rule, the plaintiff recovers, but only an amount
representing the value of the chance destroyed by the defendant’s negligence.”).
177. See Sawlani v. Mills, 830 N.E.2d 932, 947 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). An interesting caveat in the
research context is that had the participant never enrolled in research and never had his whole genome
sequenced, he would be unlikely to have learned about his predisposition, potentially negating a claim
that he lost a chance to prevent a harm.
178. See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 99, § 196; King, supra note 157, at 1356 (“Valua-
tion is animated by a premise similar to that underlying causation: that a tortfeasor should be charged
only with the value of the interest he destroyed. In determining what that value is, the preinjury
condition of the victim should be taken into account.”).
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chance had she obtained more frequent mammograms, but she still would have
had a risk of contracting, and succumbing to, breast cancer.
The foregoing analysis suggests that a researcher will have a duty to act with
reasonable care under the circumstances, although it is unclear, at present, the
parameters of the duty given the highly contextual analysis. A continued push
for an ethical obligation, guidance documents that set forth the IFs that should
be returned in particular circumstances, and an emerging research custom of
returning IFs could lead a court to conclude that researchers have a legal duty to
return IFs. Whether any such duty has been breached, however, raises questions
about which IFs must be returned, how hard a researcher must look for IFs, how
researchers should handle probabilistic information, and whether a researcher’s
duty is time limited or requires continued reexamination. Once negligence is
established—a difficult proposition in and of itself—to succeed with a legal
claim, participants would have to rely on the loss-of-a-chance doctrine to show
that researchers were the but-for cause of their inability to avoid succumbing to
a subsequent adverse medical outcome and that the researcher’s failure to
disclose was the proximate cause of the participant’s injury—claims that would
be difficult to prove. In the unlikely circumstance that a participant satisfies
these criteria, a participant would then have to demonstrate a compensable
injury, the value of which would be reduced proportionately under the loss-of-a-
chance calculations.
Research participants would also have to show that had they known about
the particular information, they would have acted differently in courts adopting
a subjective standard, or that a reasonable person would have done so if the
objective standard is used.179 Arnold would have to show that, had he or a
reasonable person known about his potential reaction to anesthesia, he or a
reasonable person would have used a different one during his surgery. Betsy
would have to show that she or a reasonable person would have gotten more
frequent mammograms. Cal would be unable to show any actions that would
have prevented his Alzheimer’s.
Although this analysis describes the complexities and uncertainties inherent
in describing whether tort liability will attach, it does not answer the broader
question of whether tort liability should attach. The broader goals of tort
law include compensating those who are injured;180 deterring undesirable
behaviors;181 notions of corrective justice, or righting wrongs;182 distributive
179. See, e.g., id. § 190 (“The specific act of negligence claimed by the plaintiff largely determines
the hypothetical alternative conduct to be compared. If the plaintiff alleges that the defendant failed to
keep a proper lookout, the hypothetical alternative case to be considered is one in which the defendant
does keep a proper lookout and the question becomes whether, had he done so, he would have avoided
injuring the plaintiff.”).
180. See, e.g., id. § 10.
181. See, e.g., id. § 10.
182. See, e.g., id. § 11.
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justice, or addressing equitable distribution of goods in society;183 and policy
and utility, or assessing what is good for society as a whole.184 Tort law is also
fundamentally concerned with fault.185
In the context of a researcher’s liability for failure to return IFs, these
considerations lead to different conclusions. Considerations of policy and utility
counsel against tort liability because potential liability could hamper socially
beneficial research. Notions of distributive justice similarly counsel against
liability because it is not clear that particular research participants have a
stronger claim to funds that would otherwise be used for socially beneficial
research. Considerations of compensating those injured and corrective justice
weakly support liability to ensure that those who are injured are adequately
protected. Ultimately, however, the analysis comes down to fault and the idea
that researchers should not be held accountable or found to be at fault for a duty
so broadly conceived. As set forth in Part III, a duty more narrowly conceived
could more reasonably give rise to fault-based liability.
III. POTENTIAL STANDARDS FOR DISCLOSING INCIDENTAL FINDINGS
Under current law, the questions of when and whether a researcher can be
held liable for failure to return IFs are still uncertain. As a result of this
confusion, researchers are left with little guidance about when liability for
failure to return IFs will attach, participants lack meaningful guidance about
which IFs they can reasonably expect to have returned and when, and courts are
left to make complicated determinations about researchers’ legal duties in light
of uncertain and evolving scientific knowledge and customary practice, poten-
tially giving rise to an inconsistent body of case law. A clearer legal standard
would address each of these concerns.
One challenge in adopting an appropriate standard is that many of the ethical,
scientific, and legal issues regarding a researcher’s duty to return IFs are still in
flux.186 Waiting until these areas settle, however, is an untenable solution.
Courts will be asked to weigh in on this issue and, absent clearer legal stan-
dards, could decide cases inconsistently—an approach that could bring confu-
sion and gridlock to an emerging scientific arena.187
To avert confusion and gridlock, this Article proposes adopting a clearer
183. See, e.g., id. § 11.
184. See, e.g., id. § 11.
185. See, e.g., id. § 10 (“The first bases tort law on moral responsibility or at least on some idea that
the defendant has in some important way wronged the plaintiff.”).
186. See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 12, at 439 (“[N]either the law of research nor the law of clinical
care is fully adequate to govern what is in essence a problem about the translational process of moving
research-derived information into the domain of clinical care. We need to develop law that is
appropriate for this translational science process. This is a substantial challenge. We need to seize the
opportunity afforded by these early days of debate to shape and develop law in a way that will support
sound and sustainable answers.”).
187. See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 12, at 439 (“Where law threatens to derail sound research or clinical
practice or the translational process between them, it offers answers that are difficult to defend and
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standard that provides ethically sound, consistent guidance about when IFs
ought to be returned and when the failure to return IFs can and should give rise
to legal liability.188 This Part argues that biomedical researchers should adopt
one of several possible standards for disclosing which IFs will be offered that
are appropriately transparent. We then advocate that courts recognize the pro-
posed standard and grant researchers that select one of these options the benefit
of accepting the terms of that selection, and then in Part IV, explore some of the
nuanced interpretations courts will have to make when adopting our proposal.
A. DISCLOSING THE PROCESS OF OFFERING INCIDENTAL FINDINGS IN THE
INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT
A clear and appropriate rule would require that researchers disclose in the
informed consent document the extent to which IFs will be returned to partici-
pants, with a corresponding legal duty to act in a manner consistent with the
terms set forth in the informed consent document.189 The approach to returning
IFs must be understandable to research participants and must set forth clear
guidelines that allow participants to ascertain which IFs will be returned to them
and the extent to which a researcher’s silence can be interpreted to indicate
good health. Negligence could be found when researchers act in ways that are
inconsistent with the policy set forth in the informed consent document.190
sustain. Law should ultimately support sound resolution of the issues surrounding return of results and
incidental findings.”).
188. This Article is not the first to suggest a clearer, more consistent standard. See, e.g., Richard R.
Sharp & Morris W. Foster, Clinical Utility and Full Disclosure of Genetic Results to Research
Participants, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Nov./Dec. 2006, at 42, 43 (proposing several approaches to standardize
the return of IFs, including making “determinations on a case-by-case basis according to the re-
searcher’s assessment of the pertinent values at stake (the current default position)”).
189. See, e.g., Fabsitz et al., supra note 33, at 576 (“Researchers should consider prospectively
whether their study has potential to yield individual research results of clinical importance and describe
plans for [returning results] in consent forms and processes.”); Parker, supra note 28, at 348 (“The
nature and probability of generating these types of findings should be disclosed to prospective subjects
during informed consent, along with plans for their management, including plans for disclosure or
nondisclosure, recording, and privacy protection.”); Rothstein, supra note 72, at 21 (“Disclosure
options should be selected by research subjects before the research begins, rather than by investigators
after a research finding.”); Wolf et al., supra note 6, at 378 (“The pathway for handling IFs, including
expert consultation when needed, should be explained in the informed consent process. Researchers
should clarify for participants the level of review that IFs will receive, so that participants do not
mistakenly rely on the belief that more work-up will be provided than the research protocol actually
calls for.”).
190. Some have suggested that delineating at the outset which IFs will be returned is a means of
contracting around liability that may violate the federal regulations governing research—regulations
that specify that research participants not be made to waive liability. See Gordon, supra note 21, at 255
(“One plausible approach to the threat of liability is to attempt to contract around the duty to disclose.
In practice, this could be accomplished by inserting language into the informed consent document
stipulating that individual research findings will not be returned to subjects under any circumstances.”);
Wolf et al., supra note 6, at 367–68 (“This would seem to raise questions about consent forms that
disclaim any researcher or institutional responsibility for managing IFs and include language claiming
to immunize researchers or their institution from any legal consequences or liability for failing to warn
research participants of IFs with serious clinical implications.”). Still others have expressed the idea
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This approach recognizes the value of both informing research participants
about what to expect throughout the informed consent process and meeting
those expectations.191 This approach is also consistent with established case law
holding that clinicians192 and third-party physicians193 can establish the parame-
ters of which results will be returned and can be held liable in tort for failing to
comply with these terms—terms upon which a recipient could reasonably be
expected to rely. This approach also recognizes, as many scholars have, that
there are many ethically permissible approaches to returning IFs.194
The next three sections outline three possible approaches that can be articu-
lated clearly enough to satisfy our goal of adequately informing research
participants. These approaches are: no return of IFs, returning all genomic data
without interpretation, and returning results consistent with a compendium.
Although they each have strengths and weaknesses, and they might not be
universally embraced as ethically optimal, we believe that they are at least
prima facie ethically defensible and provide the clearest articulation of the IFs
that will be offered to research participants. After outlining these three options,
we then articulate a framework that explores why researchers should generally
be on safer legal footing if they select from one of these options and explain
why other common, possible return paradigms are inappropriate.
1. No Return of Incidental Findings
The first proposed standard is that researchers not return IFs to participants
regardless of the seriousness of their findings. This approach acknowledges the
difficulties inherent in tracking down and locating large numbers of participants
and recognizes that a large amount of resources—both time and money—may
be needed to analyze, return, and provide counseling for the thousands of
that such disclaimers may be struck down as unconscionable or void as against public policy. See, e.g.,
Gordon, supra note 21, at 257 (“The point is not that courts will necessarily choose, on a regular basis,
to invalidate or disregard provisions in informed consent forms that purport to relieve an investigator of
the duty to disclose clinically useful individual research findings to her subjects. It is merely that there
are plausible reasons why some courts might choose to do so.”); Ram, supra note 96, at 164–65 (“Even
if a court were willing to recognize an informed consent document as some form of a contract, this
contract might be unenforceable or invalid . . . as against public policy.”). These concerns about
unconscionability and waivers of liability are particularly pertinent with regard to contract claims, but
are less so in the realm of tort law where these statements provide evidence of the duty owed rather
than of liability more generally.
191. See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 110, at 28 (“Investigators best respect participants as persons
when they disclose the terms of the research and allow people to choose whether to enroll.”).
192. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 28, at 342 (“In clinical care, for example, genetic counselors and
clinics have established policies regarding the management of misattributed parentage and other IFs.
Prior to testing, as part of the informed consent process, they typically disclose the possibility of dis-
covering such an IF and state—or negotiate—whether and to whom such findings will be disclosed, as
well as whether and where they will be recorded.”).
193. See, e.g., Stanley v. McCarver, 92 P.3d 849, 855 (Ariz. 2004) (“Finally, we note that doctors
may deal with this issue as a matter of contract. They may, for example, require x-ray subjects to con-
sent to having the results reported only to the employers.”).
194. See generally Beskow & Burke, supra note 29.
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variants that could arise in any given research participant’s whole-genome-
sequence data.195 Under this approach, no liability would attach for failing to
return IFs, but liability could attach once a researcher chooses to return IFs but
does so improperly.
An advantage of this approach is that it appropriately recognizes the distinc-
tions between research and clinical care and does not contribute to the therapeu-
tic misconception.196 This approach also respects an arguably proper allocation
of research resources. Research is funded to create generalizable knowledge that
advances the public good.197 Returning IFs can be costly, diverting funds from
research that benefits the general public to the process of returning IFs, which
generally benefits particular individuals.198
This approach does, however, have a number of disadvantages. First, given
the emerging ethical guidance encouraging the return of certain results in
certain circumstances, and given that some researchers have already started
returning IFs, a court may be unwilling to conclude that researchers have no
duty to return IFs, particularly in a case with a serious IF, a substantial
researcher–participant relationship, and a sympathetic plaintiff.199 Second, the
reason that some researchers started returning IFs is because they felt morally
bound to return IFs with significant health implications. Creating a standard
whereby researchers are not expected to return IFs, and in which researchers
may be penalized for doing so, may lead researchers to compromise their moral
conviction. Third, this approach does not address research participants’ reason-
able expectations that someone with particularized knowledge and skills who is
granted privileged access to otherwise private health information would inform
them of any significant health findings.
For these reasons, scholars have argued that not returning IFs regardless of
their severity is unethical,200 and very few have advocated for this approach.201
195. See, e.g., Cho, supra note 9, at 282 (“In genomic and genetic research, it is common for
scientists to conduct research on samples from human subjects with whom the researchers have had no
contact.”); Wolf et al., supra note 6, at 364 (“In large-scale research on big datasets (whether those
datasets aggregate genomic or imaging data), many commentators argue that researchers cannot track
huge numbers of participants, cannot locate them reliably over time, and have no budget to report
information back to participants, much less offer genetic counseling or follow-up.”).
196. See sources cited supra note 61.
197. See sources cited supra note 61.
198. See, e.g., Bredenoord et al., supra note 29, at 43.
199. See supra Part II.
200. See, e.g., Beskow & Burke, supra note 29, at 2 (noting that some have suggested that “the
failure to return clinically meaningful research results to individuals ‘seems, at least in extreme
situations, immoral, possibly illegal, and certainly unwise’” (quoting Henry T. Greely, The Uneasy
Ethical and Legal Underpinnings of Large-Scale Genomic Biobanks, 8 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM.
GENETICS 343, 359 (2007))); Bredenoord et al., supra note 29, at 42 (“At one end of the spectrum it is
argued that no individual genetic research results should be disclosed whatsoever. This, however, is an
exceptional position, because only one publication adhered strictly to a ‘no disclosure at all’ policy,
even of life-saving information—and this article was restricted to biobank research.”); Sharp & Foster,
supra note 188, at 43 (calling an approach of not returning any results “the default position of many
studies” and “deficient for several reasons”).
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Given that some researchers feel a moral obligation to return certain IFs—and
that many researchers have begun returning IFs, thereby fostering a reasonable
expectation among participants that particular IFs will be returned—setting a
threshold legal standard at no return is not an appropriate bright-line rule in
all cases, though it may be appropriate in certain circumstances (for example,
secondary research using stored specimens, or research using de-identified
samples).202
2. Return All Genomic Data Without Interpretation
An approach that has been suggested but rarely seriously considered is an
obligation to return all genetic sequence data—the nucleotide base pairs of
As, Ts, Cs, and Gs—without interpretation or annotation.203 This approach is
generally only considered before settling on a more “reasonable” position some-
where between the extremes of not returning anything and returning every-
thing.204 Nevertheless, a bright-line rule suggesting the return of all whole-
genome-sequence data without interpretation does have some advantages.
First, this approach allows researchers to fulfill their moral convictions about
returning information to participants while minimizing the burden of doing so.
Returning all genomic information without interpretation allows researchers to
bypass the requirements of additional confirmatory testing in a CLIA-approved
laboratory, additional searching, interpreting, seeking out genetic counselors,
and making decisions about which results to return on the basis of shifting
criteria of clinical utility or actionability. And as more websites and services
allow individuals to input their whole-genome-sequence data to obtain reason-
ably priced interpretations, participants can take control over when and whether
they learn more about their genetic information.205 This approach is responsive
to data that suggest that participants prefer to receive significantly more informa-
tion than has generally been returned, even if the information is not clinically
201. See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 12, at 444 (“Indeed, it has become hard to find participants in the
return of results debate who maintain that no individual results or findings should ever be returned, no
matter how clinically urgent the information.”).
202. See, e.g., Cho, supra note 9, at 282 (“In genomic and genetic research, it is common for
scientists to conduct research on samples from human subjects with whom the researchers have had no
contact.”); Wolf et al., supra note 6, at 364 (“In addition, researchers analyzing archived data may, in
fact, be secondary users who did not collect the data and never had direct contact with the research
participants, but retrieved the data from a databank or data repository.”).
203. See, e.g., McGuire, Caulfield & Cho, supra note 72, at 153 (“First, what kind of data should be
provided to research participants? Should participants simply be given their raw sequence data? For
most individuals, this form will be meaningless.”).
204. See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 12, at 445 (noting that “it is also increasingly difficult to find
commentators who argue for conveying all information derived in the research sphere, at least at this
juncture”).
205. See, e.g., PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N, supra note 16, at 59; Kayte Spector-Bagdady & Elizabeth R.
Pike, Consuming Genomics: Regulating Direct-to-Consumer Genetic and Genomic Information, 92
NEB. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
2343723 (discussing the emergence and significance of genomic interpretation services).
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actionable.206 This approach also does away with a potential obligation to
reexamine and re-notify participants with updated analyses because participants
have access to their own genomic sequence data and can seek out their own
reexaminations in light of evolving science.
This approach, like the others before it, also has some downsides. First, this
approach may not satisfy researchers’ moral conviction about alerting research
participants to IFs that may have significant health consequences. The actual
genetic information returned—the As, Ts, Cs, and Gs—does not itself alert
participants to any actionable anomalies. Second, handing genetic information
to research participants without any interpretation may overwhelm those who
do not know where to turn for interpretation or who may get their genomic data
interpreted without appropriate counseling or guidance about what the informa-
tion means.207 Finally, this approach may be technologically and logistically
difficult and expensive, particularly with regard to large genomic studies that
involve thousands of participants.
3. Return Results Consistent with a Compendium
A third proposed standard would require that researchers return IFs that are
listed in a compendium of consensus returnable IFs, as determined by a body of
expert medical geneticists. Legal liability would attach if researchers fail to
return such results. There are currently several ongoing efforts to determine
which results rise to the level of a returnable genomic findings.208 These groups
would be expected to reexamine and modify these compendia over time,
consistent with evolving science.209 Though the exact number of variants will
depend on the criteria used, one notably (and arguably conservative) early effort
resulted in a list containing fifty-six possible variants.210
One advantage of this approach is that results will be returned consistently
across all types of research and in accordance with the most rigorous determina-
206. See, e.g., Beskow & Burke, supra note 29, at 1 (“Adding to the policy debate is a growing body
of evidence documenting participants’ interest in receiving results.”); Kaufman et al., supra note 30,
at 835 (finding that over ninety percent of participants wanted their individual research results about
health risks “even if there was nothing [they] could do about them”) (alteration in original).
207. See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 12, at 445 (“Too much of that information still remains uncertain
and even mistaken, to dump it all on research participants.”).
208. See, e.g., Gliwa & Berkman, supra note 20, at 33 (“A number of groups have recently
discussed the possibility of building standard lists of variants that could or should be disclosed as
incidental findings.”); Green et al., supra note 41, at 569.
209. See, e.g., Gliwa & Berkman, supra note 20, at 40 (“[R]esearchers are regularly discovering new
variants—one estimate puts the number of total known variants growing from around 120,000 in 2012
to 150,000 in 2015—and it is likely that a significant portion of these will meet a threshold for
disclosure.”); Ravitsky & Wilfond, supra note 24, at 11(“[M]any reported associations are not robust: a
comprehensive review showed that of 166 putative associations that have been studied three or more
times, only six have been consistently replicated.”).
210. See Green et al., supra note 41, at 570–71 tbl.1.
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tion of what ought to be returned.211 Although this approach establishes a
limited obligation on the part of the researchers to hunt for findings beyond
those that are stumbled upon, the obligation is narrow and confined to those
specific variants that are well-characterized and understood.212 This approach
minimizes the more costly elements of returning IFs. Because there would be a
known universe of IFs that must be returned, deciding which results to return
and how to return them could become standardized and less costly.213 This
approach also likely satisfies a researcher’s moral convictions about returning
IFs that may have important health implications.
This approach also has some disadvantages. First, as mentioned above, there
is not yet one standardized compendium, but several emerging ones.214 And
although there is some common ground among geneticists about the IFs that
merit routine return, there is not absolute agreement, which could result in
differences among the compendia.215 Second, as mentioned above, these compen-
dia evolve over time, raising questions about when a researcher’s duty to
examine a participant’s data attaches and whether researchers have an ongoing
obligation to reexamine participant data in light of changes to the compen-
dium.216 Third, some compendia may be geared to the IFs that should be
returned in the clinic; it is unclear whether the same guidelines should apply in
research.217 Finally, an argument could be made that even this level of return
contributes to the therapeutic misconception and causes research participants to
rely on researchers and the research process in a way that was not intended.218
211. See, e.g., Fabsitz et al., supra note 33, at 577 (“Having a central body generate guidance on
what is reportable in genetic studies would provide an opportunity for broad stakeholder input, allow a
more consistent approach across research studies, and provide credible guidance for researchers and
IRBs.”).
212. See, e.g., Gliwa & Berkman, supra note 20, at 32–33.
213. See id. at 38 (“[L]ooking for the variants on the list could be as easy as pushing a button to
activate a standardized analytic tool. In this case, the burden of looking would be significantly
reduced . . . . ”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
214. See id. at 38 (“[S]ome experts have recently been discussing the possibility of creating an
authoritative list of variants that should be disclosed. There are active processes moving toward this
goal, including conferences and surveys of experts seeking agreement.”).
215. See id. at 36 (“[E]xperts can agree on only a handful of variants that should be routinely
disclosed. One study found that 100% of genetic specialists were in agreement in favor of disclosing to
adults 21 conditions or genes classified as ‘known pathogenic mutations’ . . . .”).
216. See, e.g., Cho, supra note 9, at 283 (“Reanalysis . . . raises the issue of how long the duty
persists to report findings after samples are collected or data are generated. DNA data may be analyzed
long after they are collected, and as our understanding of pleiotropy, gene-gene, and gene-environment
interaction grows, the same data may have different meaning with time.”).
217. Green, supra note 41, at 569 (“There is an active debate about the return of incidental findings
in genomic research, and recommendations for this setting are evolving. Although we hope that in-
vestigators find our process and these recommendations useful in their attempts to design thresholds
and lists for the return of genomic findings to research participants, we did not design this list for that
purpose.”).
218. See supra section I.B.
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B. A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR RETURNING INCIDENTAL FINDINGS
As applied, researchers would be able to choose their approach to returning
IFs from the options set forth above—no return of IFs, offering to return
consistent with a specified compendium, or offering full return of data without
interpretation or annotation. Researchers who select and comply with one of
these approaches should be found to have satisfied their legal duty under tort
law. Allowing researchers to choose a justifiable approach to returning IFs from
among these options and subjecting that chosen approach to Institutional Re-
view Board (IRB)219 review permits researchers to choose an option that is
consistent with their moral convictions about returning IFs, sets reasonable
expectations among research participants about the results that they should
expect to receive, and is consistent with the oft-made argument that the appropri-
ateness of returning IFs turns on a variety of factors.220 Although this approach
potentially protects researchers who choose not to return any IFs from liability,
it only does so in cases for which a researcher’s determination not to return IFs
has been reviewed and approved by an IRB. An IRB presumably would only
accept a researcher’s proposal to not return any IFs when accompanied by
well-articulated and compelling scientific or practical justifications.
Researchers who take a different approach—including a more subjective
promise to return all findings that, for example, have “significant health implica-
tions” or that are “clinically actionable” or a promise to comply with participant
preferences, regardless of the clarity with which participants express those
preferences—are setting themselves up to comply with a heightened legal duty.
Because these researchers will have begun an undertaking that they now have
a duty to satisfy responsibly,221 and because these researchers have made a
promise that can induce reliance,222 these researchers have taken upon them-
selves a duty to comply with the heightened fiduciary duty generally applied to
physicians.223
Similarly, some researchers might want to return IFs consistent with a
complex solicitation of participant preferences.224 To the extent that return
219. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.107 (2012). The Common Rule specifies the composition of IRBs and the
criteria that must be used in reviewing research protocols.
220. See supra section I.B.
221. See, e.g., DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 99, § 410 (“The general rule that under-
takings can create a duty of care is often expressed by saying one who voluntarily assumes a duty must
then perform that duty with reasonable care.”).
222. See, e.g., id. § 410 (“[T]he plaintiff must show reliance upon the defendant’s undertaking or
assumed duty. Reliance shows that the defendant’s failure to live up to his undertaking was a cause in
fact of the plaintiff’s harm.”).
223. See supra section II.A.1.
224. One ethically permissible way that researchers could provide more than is strictly required is to
have researchers return IFs consistent with participant preferences. This could be accomplished either
through a process of informed disclosure of potential IFs or through ascertaining participant preferences
at the outset. The process of informed disclosure entails notifying all research participants of the range
of IFs—from a predisposition to Alzheimer’s disease to a propensity for developing breast cancer—that
were discovered among all research participants and inviting participants to get in touch with the
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consistent with participant preferences hinges on terms that are difficult to
define, like “actionability” and “clinical significance,” this approach would not
bring clarity to participants about the IFs that they can reasonably expect to
have returned and should not be one of the options for researchers. Although
this approach may lead to an ethically sound policy for returning results, it
would remove researchers from the safety of a clearly stated and articulable
approach to returning IFs.
We acknowledge that our proposal could be controversial in that it would
allow researchers to escape legal liability in some cases where people will have
a strong moral intuition that they should have returned patently life-saving
medical information. For instance, in Example 1, in a circumstance where an
approach of not returning IFs was approved by an IRB, Dr. Ames would be
insulated from suit for failing to disclose his participant’s risk of being exposed
to certain anesthetic agents. As is often noted, however, law and ethics can
frequently diverge, and this seems to be a case in point. We believe that the
value of a clearly articulated legal rule in this complicated and important
research field outweighs the moral distress that some people will feel regarding
very difficult marginal cases.
IV. GUIDANCE FOR COURTS
Courts that are faced with legal challenges brought by research participants
who allege inadequate or improper disclosure of IFs will almost certainly find
themselves faced with a variety of confounding fact patterns. This Part provides
guidance to courts to help navigate this difficult terrain. We address (1) the
implications of inadequate or silent consent-form language, (2) factors relevant
to determine the scope of a researcher’s duty, and (3) how to assess whether
adequate disclosure has been made.
A. INTERPRETING CONSENT-FORM LANGUAGE
In Part III, we proposed a paradigm in which researchers could choose from
a menu of ethically justifiable options (subject to IRB review) and would have
to clearly articulate their plan for managing IFs during the informed consent
process. This does not, however, account for cases in which the informed
consent is silent about—or inadequately addresses—the issue of returning IFs.
The question for courts, then, is how to assess informed consent documents that
researchers if they would like to have their individual IFs returned to them. A second approach would
involve obtaining participant preferences at the outset of research, allowing participants to make known
to researchers the particular types of results they would like to have returned to them. Under this
approach, participants would be able to specify, for example, that they would like to learn about a
predisposition to harm from certain kinds of anesthesia but would not like to know about a predisposi-
tion to Alzheimer’s disease. Although these approaches may lead to an ethically sound policy for
returning results, they remove researchers from the safety of a clearly stated and articulable approach to
returning IFs.
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do not explicitly or sufficiently address IFs.
As set forth above, because genomic sequencing generates so much data,
researchers are expected to explicitly disclose a number of pieces of informa-
tion, including: (1) that the subject’s entire genome will be sequenced; (2) that
there is a high likelihood that IFs will arise; and (3) the plan for managing any
IFs that do arise.225 To the extent researchers set forth an IRB-approved
approach to returning IFs, that should be the standard by which researchers
are judged for purposes of assessing legal liability. For informed consent that
is silent, or that inadequately addresses the return of IFs, the general assumption
should not be that researchers are therefore protected from legal liability.
Rather, courts should look carefully and skeptically at inadequate consent
documents.
There are, however, two circumstances in which a silent or inadequate
informed consent document might be justified. The first justification for inad-
equate consent language relates to the evolving nature and adoption of new
sequencing technologies. As genomic-sequencing technologies became avail-
able, they were first adopted by a handful of researchers with significant
genetic-research expertise.226 During this period of early adoption when there
was no clear ethical guidance, researchers and IRBs were understandably
unsure about how to address the IFs arising from genomic sequencing during
the consent process. As a result, informed consent disclosure about the possibil-
ity of IFs was varied, less evolved, and perhaps—if judged by today’s standards—
inadequate. Courts should therefore be sympathetic to a researcher with an
inadequate consent document if the relevant document originated when there
was no established practice regarding the informed consent disclosure of IFs.
Similarly, a researcher might have a justifiably insufficient informed consent
form if she can demonstrate that the specific language was consistent with the
IRB’s practices or institutional policies during this early adoption period.227
This early stage has given way, however, to much more widespread adoption
as the price of sequencing has dropped and a wider range of researchers have
become intrigued by the power of whole-genome sequencing. The increased
uptake has been accompanied by a proliferation of debate and discussion in the
research ethics literature,228 such that no researcher today could reasonably
claim ignorance about the need for clear language about IFs in the informed
consent document. Reasonable researchers should be expected to have a well-
articulated plan as soon as they should have been made aware of the contours of
this ethical controversy.
A second justification for inadequate informed consent language is that for
225. See supra Part III.
226. See, e.g., Collins et al., supra note 4, at 841–42; Morozova & Marra, supra note 4, at 257–58.
227. We acknowledge that open questions remain about the possibility of IRB exposure to liability.
Nothing discussed here is meant to suggest an argument for such an outcome, but a full discussion of
this topic is beyond the scope of this Article.
228. See supra Part I.
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certain kinds of research, the relationship between the researcher and the
individual participant might be sufficiently distant so as to obviate the need for
language about IFs. Under this line of reasoning, certain kinds of research
would effectively exempt researchers from a duty of having to offer IFs,
and from a corresponding duty to include informed consent language about
IFs. This category might include researchers whose valid methodological
choices make it extraordinarily difficult (or even impossible) to recontact
participants (such as biobanks or studies involving de-identified samples) or
where the inherent characteristics of the research mean that offering to return
IFs would be prohibitively resource intensive (such as large-scale public-health
studies).
If an informed consent document is silent or inadequate and neither of the
justifications have been met, the scope of a researcher’s legal duty will be
defined not by the silent or inadequate informed consent language but instead
will turn on a number of factors set forth below. Allowing researchers to
establish the parameters of potential legal liability through appropriate informed
consent disclosure is part of recognizing the importance of adequate disclosure.
A researcher’s failure to adequately set forth an IF disclosure policy results in
legal liability that hinges on the multifactored analysis set forth below, thereby
introducing an element of uncertainty to a researcher’s defense against liability.
B. FACTORS IMPORTANT FOR DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF A RESEARCHER’S LEGAL
DUTY TO RETURN INCIDENTAL FINDINGS
Under our proposed framework, if plaintiffs can demonstrate that the in-
formed consent language was inadequate and there is no justification for that
inadequacy, the analysis then shifts to the difficult task of determining the extent
of a researcher’s legal duty concerning the return of IFs. As discussed in Part II,
because of differences in clinical care and research, we disagree with the notion
that courts should use the stricter fiduciary standard typically applied to physi-
cians. Rather, we suggest that courts should use a more general, multifactored
test often associated with third-party physicians. Under this test, researchers
have a reasonable duty of care, taking into account a range of contextual factors
and circumstances, including the factors described in section II.A.3.
Not all of the factors to be considered are equal, however, and some might
carry more weight than others. One critical factor is whether and to what extent
a research participant reasonably relied on a researcher to return IFs. This
factor could be satisfied by showing that the researcher (by word or action)
explicitly took on a duty of disclosure on which it was reasonable for the
participant to rely. Evidence demonstrating that a participant reasonably relied
on the researcher to disclose important IFs would strongly weigh in favor of a
researcher’s legal duty to return IFs. Absent evidence of an explicit promise,
such an argument would, in large part, be a function of the depth of relationship
between a researcher and participant and the extent to which the relationship
resembled a typical doctor–patient relationship.
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Courts might look to a number of other factors to evaluate a claim that the
researcher–participant relationship gave rise to justifiable reliance. One poten-
tially important factor is the nature or design of the research. Late-stage clinical
trials would be most likely to give rise to justifiable reliance, given that
participants generally receive clinical interventions with a prospect of direct
individual benefit. Studies in which there is a long-term relationship between
the researcher and participant (such as natural-history protocols) might similarly
be convincing. This would be particularly true when that relationship has an
explicitly clinical component, like if the study team provides standard-of-care
treatment as a component of the research. Studies on samples from biobanks,
particularly when there is minimal or no contact between the research team and
the participant, are less likely to give rise to circumstances that justify reliance.
Other study characteristics might also provide evidence of justifiable reli-
ance. The existence of study resources (such as genetic counselors) for return-
ing certain genetic information might support a plaintiff’s claim. Conversely,
the complete absence of any infrastructure for returning results would suggest
the opposite. Researcher expertise in genomic science (or lack thereof) would
follow a similar line of reasoning: clinicians—and medical geneticists in particu-
lar—would be more likely to lead participants to justifiable reliance; basic
scientists and non-clinicians are presumably much less likely to do so.
C. ASSESSING WHETHER ADEQUATE DISCLOSURE HAS BEEN MADE
Even if a court concludes that researchers have a duty to return IFs, questions
will remain about whether and when researchers have adequately satisfied their
disclosure obligations. This question will be complicated by the fact that, as
sequencing technology improves and is increasingly incorporated into research
protocols, a growing number of professional societies and governmental agen-
cies will weigh in with their thoughts about the contours of researchers’
obligations to return IFs. To the extent that these guidance documents point
towards returning IFs, they have the potential to give rise to a corresponding
legal duty to return IFs in genomic research, thus increasing the chances that
participants will successfully be able to win liability suits. This analysis will
likely be far from straightforward; much of this guidance is divergent and
evolving, and many of these documents make self-limiting disclaimers about
how they should be used by the courts.
As with all questions of fact about medical practice, courts will have to
weigh a variety of kinds of evidence. In this case, professional association and
government guidance documents are just one part of the picture. It is arguably
even more important to determine the extent to which certain categories of
researchers (such as clinical researchers) as a group have begun implementing
this guidance to determine whether any standard of care has developed. The
challenge will be to determine how to draw appropriate boundaries around each
relevant professional group. Courts must consider whether they should establish
a prevailing standard of care by looking to the entire population of researchers,
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to the set of clinical researchers, or to some more limited subset. We endorse the
view that courts should draw the line broadly as an initial starting point but
suggest they carefully consider contextual factors that suggest excluding certain
groups for whom imposing a duty would be unduly burdensome—such as
biobanks or basic science researchers working with de-identified samples.
Another question remains: to what lengths will researchers reasonably be
required to go to inform participants of IFs? One circumstance in which this
question could arise is when researchers no longer have a participant’s updated
contact information. In most cases, researchers ask participants to provide
contact information during initial intake, but participants retain the responsi-
bility of updating their information over time. If a participant fails to do so and
later sues, a defendant researcher will presumably argue that the failure to
provide updated contact information releases the researcher from an obligation
to disclose. As a complete defense, this seems unconvincing because it places
all of the responsibility for maintaining contact on the participants and because
conducting some basic inquiries about an individual’s whereabouts is not
terribly burdensome in the modern digital age. With that said, courts must
recognize that there are limits on a researcher’s ability and obligation to actively
seek out lost participants. As discussed above, researchers are not clinicians
and do not have the same clear obligation to act in the best interest of their
participants.229 Research is undertaken with the goal of producing socially
beneficial, generalizable knowledge,230 so it is unreasonable to expect research-
ers to devote resources to tracking down participants to the extent that doing so
undermines their ability to answer important research questions.
The manner of disclosure might also be subject to dispute. For example, can a
researcher discharge his or her duty by returning the information in a letter or
phone conversation? Or are researchers instead required to provide robust
genetic counseling to ensure that participants fully understand the clinical
meaning of the incidental finding? We argue that although researchers are not
necessarily obligated to provide genetic counseling, they must responsibly
convey information in a way that is readily understandable. The manner of
disclosure should be tied to the importance and urgency of the information
being disclosed or the complexity or nuance of a particular finding.
CONCLUSION
The increasing use of whole-genome sequencing in research is likely to give
rise to a wide range of potential IFs—from indications of a propensity to
229. See supra Part II.
230. See, e.g., Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 838 (Md. 2001) (“The
experiment is driven by the investigator’s dedication to the advancement of knowledge . . . ; it is also
driven by society’s interest in future benefits that will flow from medical discoveries.”); Belmont
Report, supra note 39, at 23,193 (“‘[R]esearch’ designates an activity designed to test an hypothesis,
permit conclusions to be drawn, and thereby to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge.”).
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develop breast cancer to findings about which the meaning and importance are
still unknown. Though the extent of any ethical obligation is still unsettled, a
number of scholars, researchers, and institutional groups have promulgated
guidance documents that attempt to set forth the IFs that should be returned and
when they should be returned, or that have advanced criteria to be used in
making these determinations. Researchers have responded by implementing
their own piecemeal approaches to returning IFs. This push toward an ethical
obligation to return particular IFs, coupled with a move among researchers
towards returning IFs, has given rise to concerns about tort liability for failure
to offer to return these results.
The extent to which a researcher could be held liable for inadequately
returning IFs is uncertain. The extent of a researcher’s legal duty to return IFs
turns on a number of factors, including the extent of any researcher–participant
relationship, research customs or standards with regard to returning IFs, and
guidance documents addressing when IFs should be returned. The last two
factors are still very much in flux. A researcher’s liability will also turn on a
court’s willingness to import the loss-of-a-chance causation analysis into re-
search. But the researcher would be unable to ascertain at the outset when the
failure to return IFs will give rise to liability.
Accordingly, this Article advocates adoption of a transparent standard that
makes clear to participants which IFs, if any, will be returned to them. A
researcher should decide at the outset which of several explainable approaches
to returning IFs will be taken. The approach chosen, reviewable by an IRB,
must be set forth in the informed consent document and will form the basis of a
tort law duty—a researcher’s failure to comply with the terms in the informed
consent document could lead to a finding of negligence.
This framework gives deference to a researcher’s considered judgment about
the best approach to returning IFs given the particular circumstances of a
research protocol, while allowing participants to know from the outset about
which IFs will be returned and when, and it provides guidance to courts about
whether liability should attach, given the evolving ethical, legal, and scientific
considerations.
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